Dooyeweerd: Growth of Humanistic Antinomy/ Fàs Antìnomi na Daonnaireachd

Raphael: "Sgoil na h-Aithne"

LEABHAR 1 EARRANN II 
FÀS A' BHUN-ANTÌNOMI SAN IDÈA CHOSMONÒMACH DEN FHEALLSANACHD-IMEANACHD DHAONNAIREACH.

CAIBIDEIL 1

BUN-STRUCTAR NA GRUNND-IDÈA TAR-CHEUMNAIL DAONNAIRICH AGUS NA POLARACHD INTRICH EADAR AN T-IDÈAL-SAIDHEINS CLASAIGEACH AGUS IDÈAL NA PEARSANTACHD.

§ 1 - RO-RÀDH. FEALLSANACHD DAONNAIREACH AGUS AN SEALLADH-BEATHA/-SAOGHAIL DAONNAIREACH.

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VOLUME 1 PART II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASIC ANTINOMY IN THE COSMONOMIC IDEA OF HUMANISTIC IMMANENCE-PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE HUMANISTIC TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA AND THE INTRINSIC POLARITY BETWEEN THE CLASSICAL SCIENCE-IDEAL AND THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY

§ 1 - INTRODUCTION. HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LIFE AND THE WORLD

     At least in its dominating trends modern Western immanence-philosophy is rooted in a common Humanistic ground-motive of a religious character, which we learned to know in our Prolegomena as the motive of nature and freedom. The various forms of the transcendental ground-Idea of the different schools in which this central religious motive has found its theoretical expression may at first sight seem somewhat confusing by their great diversity. Nevertheless, this transcendental Idea possesses a fixed basic structure, which can be seen in each variation.

     Of course historical connections between modern Humanistic philosophy and medieval and ancient systems are present everywhere. However, the former displays a new character, which is not to be explained in terms of a purely historical development of human thought.

     In this philosophy the connection between the basic structure of the transcendental ground-Idea, and that of the pre-theoretic Humanistic world- and life-view has gradually developed to such an extent, that the boundaries between the theoretic and the pre-theoretical attitude of thought seem to have been wiped out. As a result, in most instances, the Humanist is unable to account for his cosmonomic Idea in philosophy. He thinks it is possible to philosophize in an unprejudiced fashion, because his religious presuppositions are accepted by the world- and life-view of Humanism, as self-evident and indubitable.

     The autonomy of human reason was not — as in the ancient Greek world — a postulate of theoretic philosophy only. It was from the outset proclaimed by the Humanistic life- and world-view, itself. The dogmatic reliance on theoretical thought was not undermined until the modern crisis in the foundations of the Humanistic world- and life-view began to cast its shadow upon philosophical reflection. Modern existentialism was born out of this crisis. It broke with the scientific conception of philosophy and sought to play the same role that had previously been filled by the now uprooted world- and life-view.

     Ancient and medieval philosophy respectively were balanced by the counter poise of the religious world- and life-view of the people and the church. The latter could criticize and stimulate philosophical thought from the practical, pre-theoretical point of view. Humanistic philosophy, on the other hand, does not find any counterpoise in its own world- and life-view. At the time of the Enlightenment and of the natural scientific positivism of the last century, Humanistic philosophy invaded the latter in popular form and imprinted upon it its quasi-scientific mask.

     This theoretization of the world- and life-view of Humanism led to the serious eradication of the boundary between the scientific and naïve attitude of thought which we noticed above; and it undermined all sense of responsibility in the personal religious commitment implied in every philosophic standpoint. Modern existentialism has sharply taken exception to this impersonal attitude of philosophic reflection.

The undermining of the personal sense of responsibility in the religious commitment.

     During the Enlightenment the Humanistic world- and life-view appealed to science as the crown-witness of sovereign reason. The personal responsibility involved in the choice of one's religious position was shifted without question upon the shoulders of "Reason", the impersonal divinity which had been elevated to the throne.

     Here could be observed a noteworthy interaction between the rationalistic philosophy and the world- and life-view of Humanism. At its beginning, at the time of the Renaissance, the latter was completely aware of its real religious motive. However, in the eighteenth century when Humanistic philosophy had been popularized, this notion gradually began to fade away. The Humanistic world- and life-view lost the impulse to arrive at religious self-consciousness in its pre-theoretical attitude. It now believed in the impartiality and sovereign infallibility of theoretical thought. Even when philosophy chose to express itself in a metaphysical theology, it had lost the stimulus to religious self-consciousness. For it no longer had a counter-poise in a Humanistic world- and life-view which was conscious of its religious ground-motive (To be sure, in so far as the Christian world- and life view had not been unduly influenced by immanence philosophy, it vehemently opposed the latter. However, Humanistic philosophy does not have a common root with the Christian world- and life-view).

     The Humanistic world- and life-view allowed itself to be deprived of its initial vitality without offering the slightest opposition. It lost the notion of the irreplaceable significance of the naïve attitude toward reality. It preferred to be quasi-scientific and became static and abstract. No longer did it retain any proximity to life, but it made its pronouncements as from a theoretical distance. Neither did the Humanistic view of the world and of life protest against the falsification of naïve experience by the theoretical interpretation of rationalistic philosophy. This was only possible, because the Humanistic world- and life-view had itself been made into a theory.

     It is true, that in the period of Sturm and Drang, and in the subsequent period of Romanticism, the Humanistic ideal of personality strongly reacted against rationalistic philosophy. But, this reaction was too much drenched with theoretical philosophical motives to keep a sufficient distance from Humanistic philosophy. And, just as the Renaissance, this reaction was too aristocratic in character to find any real echo among the larger classes of society. Its failure to appeal to the masses was most times the weak point of the Humanistic world- and lifeview, and in this respect the latter was at a positive disadvantage, when compared with the Christian view.

     Undoubtedly Humanism acquired an influence on the masses during the Enlightenment and in the period of natural scientific positivism by popular scientific literature, belles lettres, and other means of propaganda. However, this influence came from above, viz. from philosophy which was popularized. This was also the case at the time of the French revolution and in the rise of socialism as a mass-movement. Humanistic philosophy has never found a fruitful and deep inner religious contact with a life- and world-view which, as the Christian one, lives spontaneously in the heart of the simple man and calmly retains its pious certainty against all errors of theoretical thought.

     The Dutch Christian statesman and thinker, Dr ABRAHAM KUYPER, discovered this weak point in the relationship between the philosophical theory and the life- and world-view of Humanism. And, in his struggle against the enlightened liberalism of the last (19th) century, he concentrated his attack upon this very point.

     It is true that, in the first decades of the XXth century, especially under the influence of the KANT-renaissance, a strong impulse was revealed to delineate the boundary between philosophical theory and a life- and world-view. We have paid full attention to this tendency in the latter part of the Prolegomena. In this very period, however, the undermining influence of philosophical historicism and relativism had penetrated into the latter. And this relativism has led to the modern crisis in Humanism. A historistic philosophy of life was born out of this crisis. And especially in the period after the first world war, it began to produce a new outlook (1) in syndicalistic and fascistic movements. This new outlook was concerned with the suggestion of the masses rather than with questions of truth.
(1) Translator's note: Henceforth the term "outlook" shall be used instead of the longer expression world- and life-view. D. H. F.

(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I, Part 2, Chap 1/1, pp 169-172)