Leabhar Cheanannais: Na Ceithir Soisgeulaichean
Am "mothachadh tar-cheumnail" mas fhìor mar hupostatachd na smaoine teòiriceil daonna na cùlachadh coitcheann bho làn-bhrìgh na fìrinne.
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The so-called "transcendental consciousness" as hypostatization of theoretical human thought in its general apostasy from the fulness of meaning of truth.
By the hypostatization of the so-called "transcendental consciousness" as Origin of universal validity, the basis of the validity of truth is really undermined.
For in this hypostatization, truth is made dependent upon the really general apostasy of thought in the immanence-philosophy.
It makes no sense to suppose, that the immanent laws of human knowledge should draw theoretical thought away from the religious fulness of meaning of verity. It is rather the apostate self-hood in the grip of its dialectical religious ground-motive that attempts to dissociate these laws from their coherence of meaning and from their religious root and thereby subjectively falsifies their signification in the judgment. The concept "normal consciousness' is not identical with the "norm of consciousness".
The truth and universal validity of a judgment do not find their criterion in an apo-state "normal-consciousness".
The great diversity and divergence of life- and world-views is, according to LITT, an indication that they are only individual impressions of life, and that they lack a universally valid standard of truth. But any one who sets out in this way renders no service with his arguments to the view, that only judgments of theoretical thought can make claim to universally valid truth. A simple reference to the dividedness of philosophical and even of special scientific theories among themselves may be a sufficient stimulus to hastily abandon this by-way.
Impurity of the opposition "universal-validity" and individuality as a contradictory one.
For the rest, in dealing with the problem of knowledge, we shall show, that the opposition: universal-validity in theoretical thought versus concrete individuality in the life- and world-view, is impure, since even in theoretical thought the individuality of the thinker may in no way be eliminated. The view that in theoretical thought there should be no place for the individual is a remnant of the rationalistic view of science of the period of the "Enlightenment".
We pointed out, that a life- and world-view can follow no systematic tendency in its development, but must remain in immediate proximity to the concrete situations of life, even though it rightly gives a general formulation to its judgments. Focused in the full temporal reality, it, or rather its adherent, directs the religious vision of totality toward the reality of life in its concrete structure. Historical evolution, too, the tempo of which it ought to follow in its thought, is not conceived by it in scientific style, but in its continuous involvement in full temporal reality as a not yet theoretically distinguished component of the latter.
In this way, LITT'S thesis as to the unscientific individual character of the life- and world-view is reduced to its proper proportions.
But how do matters stand with regard to his view, that a life- and world-view, in distinction from philosophy, lives in a sphere of common convictions?
Neither life- and world-view, nor philosophy is to be understood individualistically.
A life- and world-view is not individualistic, but truly social in origin. It is ex-origine the common conviction, subjected to the norm of the full truth, of a human community bound together by a central religious motive.
We have seen, however, in our transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought, that philosophy, too, necessarily issues from such a religious ground-motive, which rests at the basis of a particular philosophical community of thought.
In philosophy as well as in a life- and world-view, social prejudices of an illegitimate character can show themselves, which hang together with the limitation of vision (view) of the social environment and consequently should be overcome (class and racial prejudices, prejudices of a limited church group, etc., etc.). Modern sociology of thought (SCHELER, KARL MANNHEIM, JERUSALEM and others) has cast a penetrating light on this state of affairs. But since philosophy, by reason of its theoretical attitude of thought in general, comes sooner to a critical standpoint with respect to such illegitimate prejudices, it can at this point exercise a wholesome influence on the pre-theoretical reflection. For it is impossible, that philosophy and a life- and world-view should not influence each other mutually.
Philosophic thought should find in the life- and world-view of the thinker a continuous actual stimulus to religious self-reflection. Conversely, a life- and world-view should come to theoretical clarity in philosophic thought.
But as little as philosophy may fall with impunity into the concrete tone of the life- and world-view, as little may the life- and world-view accept with impunity the distance from the full reality which is suitable to theoretical thought.
One in root, making mutual appeal to each other, and influencing each other, they, nevertheless, should remain sharply distinguished, each according to its own task and essential character.
(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I, pp 163-165)
(End of Vol I: Prolegomena)
