Experimental Relating of Dooyeweerd Text to Mark Rothko Painting

Mark Rothko: No. 61 (Rust and Blue) (1953)

Dear D & A,

A fraught experiment! 

I am currently reading through Dooyeweerd's very early book (1931) "The Crisis in Humanist Political Theory". I certainly don't recommend it as a starter. Part I is particularly difficult. Also, key terminology in this book was eventually modified.

Anyhow, a passage I read this morning is reasonably accessible (at least from where I'm now at). And I thought I could maybe squeeze some juice out of it to do with our potential discussion of Mark Rothko.

Firstly, I present the piece of text as Dooyeweerd wrote it (or at least the book's English translation of his Dutch). It is to do with "Statehood" and the "Aspect" or "Mode of Consciousness" of Jurisprudence. 

Secondly I have tried to transpose it all [with my own words in square brackets] to address painting and the "Aspect" or "Mode of Consciousness" of Aesthetics.

I preface all the above with a resumé list of Dooyeweerd's "Law-spheres" (also called "Aspects", "Functions", "Modalities", "Modes of Consciousness" etc):
_________________________
NORMATIVE (post-analytical) 
15. Certitudinal, Pistic, Fiduciary 
14. Ethical
13. Juridical 
12. Aesthetical [nucleus = "harmony"]
11. Economical
10. Social
9. Lingual/ Symbolical
8. Cultural/Formational/Historical
7. Logical

NATURAL (pre-analytical) 
6. Sensory
5. Biotical
4. Physical
3. Kinematic
2. Spatial
1. Numerical
_________________________

Okay. The following is the original text. We must be very wary of Dooyeweerd's (subsequently discontinued) use of the term "spiritual" here. He is not at all meaning, for example, "supernatural". He is simply referring to the "normative" or "post-analytical" law-spheres / modes of consciousness. Words hyperlinked in green take the reader to J. Glenn Friesen's "Dooyeweerd Glossary":

ORIGINAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF TEXT:
In order to reduce this seemingly obvious argument to its proper dimension, we need only recall that not a single "thing-structure" may be absolutized (as done in metaphysics) into a thing in itself which as such would be detached from the religious root of our entire temporal cosmos. As a community the state can only become real through human activity, as we saw earlier, the human being as such has no "leading function" in time.

In this manner all temporal things, natural as well as spiritual ones, depend on human activity for a deepening of their meaning. As such they do not lose their thing-structure, unless they are being transformed into another entity with a new thing-structure that has a different leading function. 

That also holds for the state as an organised community. But this particular organized community has, as such, its "leading-function" in the jural aspect. And all deepening of its meaning, which the state's structure exhibits in law, remains essentially determined by its meaning-individual structural principle. 

Both the private-legal and the public-legal idea of the just state contain a juridical deepening of meaning in the authority structure of the state as against the autocratic types of organized governmental authority. 

Yet throughout this deepening of meaning the state remains qualified by its jural function. As soon as one were to put this structural principle aside, the state would cease to exist. One cannot seek the "leading-function" of the state in any other law-sphere without disrupting the very concept of state. 

Nevertheless, the idea of right, which points beyond the meaning of the jural towards the meaning of the cosmically later spheres, and which as the consummation of right points beyond time towards the religious fullness of meaning of divine justice, retains its sway over the meaning-individual jural domain of the state.

(Herman Dooyeweerd, "The Crisis in Humanist Political Theory", 1931, pp151, 152)

MY [FREELY ADAPTED TEXT] TRANPOSED TO AESTHETIC CONTEXT:
In order to reduce this seemingly obvious argument to its proper dimension, we need only recall that not a single "thing-structure" may be absolutized (as done in metaphysics) into a thing in itself which as such would be detached from the religious root of our entire temporal cosmos. As [an artwork] the [painting] can only become real through human activity, and as we saw earlier, the human being as such has no ["demarcating mode of consciousness"] in time. 

In this manner all temporal things, natural as well as [normative] ones, depend on human activity for a deepening of their meaning. As such they do not lose their thing-structure, unless they are being transformed into another entity with a new thing-structure that has a different [demarcating mode of consciousness. For example, the "thing-structure" of raw pigment is demarcated within the "physical" mode of consciousness, but if used in a painting it becomes part of a new "thing-structure" demarcated within the "aesthetic" mode of consciousness.]

That also holds for the [painting] as [organised materials]. But this particular [organisation of materials] has, as such, its ["demarcating mode of consciousness"] in the [aesthetic] aspect. And all deepening of its meaning, which the [painting's] structure exhibits [aesthetically], remains essentially determined by its meaning-individual structural principle. 

Both the [referentially abstract] and the [non-referentially abstract] idea of the [successful painting] contain an [aesthetic] deepening of meaning in the [formal] structure of [painting] as against the [conventional] types of [artistic subject-matter]. 

Yet throughout this deepening of meaning the [painting] remains qualified by its [aesthetic] function. As soon as one were to put this structural principle aside, the [painting] would cease to exist. One cannot seek the [demarcating mode of consciousness] of the [painting] in any other law-sphere without disrupting the very concept of [painting]. 

Nevertheless, the idea of [harmony], which points beyond the meaning of the [aesthetic] towards the meaning of the cosmically later spheres, and which as the consummation of [harmony] points beyond time towards the religious fullness of meaning of divine [harmony], retains its sway over the meaning-individual [aesthetic] domain of [painting].

Regards,
Fearghas.

Mark Rothko: No. 6 (Violet, Green and Red) (1951)

___________________________________

Dear D,

I have written too much too closely posted already. But, whatever, here is a short initial contribution to further possible discussion of the difficult ''Ding an sich" issue. 

Nothing immediately jumps out at me from your Torrance quotes to take issue with on this specific matter, though I would be extremely surprised if he in fact agrees with Dooyeweerd's view. People can talk similar language but mean such different things. 

As for "given-ness", Dooyeweerd was fully engaged with the matter of identifying real "states of affairs". That is pretty much the nub of his philosophy. He is not an abstractionist. He is not a rationalist. He is a valiant champion of everyday actuality. 

Dooyeweerd rejects the notion of "substance" because he thinks that it is a reification of thought (via Hellenism). In other words the notion of "substance" is a fundamental misreading of existence. This includes the idea of the "soul" as "substance" (being a reification of our rationality, following the Platonic view of "reason" being pure immutable timeless form). And likewise the "Ding an sich" misunderstanding of "things" having a primary core behind so-called secondary qualities. 

Dooyeweerd considers social organisations such as football clubs, art associations, pre-school nurseries, geopolitical States, businesses, etc to be "things", as well as rocks, trees, fish, and cars etc. What is the "substance" of "Inverness Harriers Jogging Club", or whatever?

So for Dooyeweerd there is no raw, neutral "substance" out there, alien to us. The Cosmos is somehow enmeshed with humankind. That is why the Cosmos "fell" with/in Adam, and is redeemed with/ in the Last Adam, the True Man, Christ.

Andy Bannister of the Ravi Zacharias ministry recently took over from David Robertson as director of the Dundee-based "Solas" apologetics online project. I listened to an audio by him from a few years ago: "Responding to the New Atheists". 

Just after 16.00 mins in, he makes the statement: "Science is metaphysically neutral". I rewound and listened again. Could he be correct? He has just sold the shop, I thought. How does the "metaphysical neutrality of science" comport with Romans 1? Or with the Scriptural assertion that "All things are through Him, for Him, and to Him" etc? ("Science", of course, views the entire cosmos as its remit. And cf Carl Sagan's famous quote: “The Cosmos is all that is or was or ever will be".)

Is the aesthetic research conducted by art not also scientific? Is Art "metaphysically neutral" too? (I do realise the contention implicit in these questions).

Dooyeweerd insists reality is characterised not as (Hellenistic) "being", but as "meaning". The structures (ordinances) of reality are NOT neutral. They are meaning (as distinct from having meaning). They are sustained by Christ, therefore testify to Christ. Exhaustively. Humans have nowhere else to go. Nowhere to hide. There is only encounter with Christ whichever direction we turn. Therefore whether we eat or drink or whatever, we (whether we like it or not) refer to Him. Believers are called to acknowledge that with thanksgiving. He is the Way. He is the Door. He is Water. He is Light. (As you know, I am not, of course, talking "pantheism" here).

This post has got too long again. If I understood matters better I could be more concise...

J Glenn Friesen has a couple of related glossary entries:

This one on "Ding an sich" is fairly short.

This one on "Thing" is longer...

😊

Fearghas.

PS I might also mention here J Glenn Friesen's most recent essay which superbly relates Dooyeweerd back to a critique of Kant. 

Friesen writes:

"How do Dooyeweerd’s modes of consciousness relate to our experience of reality? Does he have the same problem as Lask did in relating Kant’s logical categories to the things of our experience? Dooyeweerd would later clarify that the modalities relate to reality because the individuality structures [things] of our experience function within the same modes. We can therefore make analogies from our experience of things to our modes of consciousness."  

(Dooyeweerd’s Idea of Modalities: The Pivotal 1922 Article).