Culaidh Nàdarra le David Davidsz. de Heem (c. 1668)
CAIBIDEIL 2
STRUCTAIREAN MODALACH CÈILLE.
§ 1 - RO-RÀDH.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MODAL STRUCTURES OF MEANING.
§ 1 - INTRODUCTION.
As an introduction to subsequent expositions I will raise a question which, to my knowledge, has never yet been brought to bear on the subject of the present chapter. And yet it is fundamental to our entire view of the structure of the modal aspects of human experience and to the whole method of scientific concept-formation.
This basic question is concerned with the analogical use of fundamental concepts in the different branches of science. The fundamental fields of research of the various special sciences are defined according to the different modal aspects of human experience in its integral sense, though within these modal boundaries there is room for further specializing (1).
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(1) General sociology, anthropology etc. are not specific sciences in the sense meant here. The difficult problem concerning the delimitation of their fields of research will be discussed in Vol. III.
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At first sight it may seem that the analogical concepts are not bound to these special modal fields of research, but give expression to the inner unity of all scientific thought. But a closer analysis of their specific scientific meaning shows that the latter differs with the different modalities of the scientific viewpoint. Nevertheless, analogy doubtless refers to an inter-modal coherence of meaning between the aspects.
How is this state of affairs to be explained? Here we are confronted with a fundamental problem which has not found due philosophic interest in consequence of the immanence-standpoint as such, and the dialectical basic motives which rule the latter.
It is true that Greek and Scholastic logic and metaphysics paid special attention to the analogical concepts, and distinguished them from the generic and specific ones. In addition, real analogy was sharply distinguished from the mere metaphor of common speech. To the analogical fundamental concept of 'being' (analogic entis) all the others were related. This concept, however, was conceived of in a speculative metaphysical sense. It contained no reference to the cosmic order of time in which all modal difference of meaning is founded. The concept of 'being' was determined by the Greek dialectical basic motive of form and matter.
The origin of the analogical concept of Being.
PARMENIDES conceived of the eternal form of Being in a rigid metaphysical opposition to the matter-principle of the eternally flowing stream of becoming and decay. His concept of Being was in itself nothing but an hypostatization of the copula 'is' in the analytical relation of identity: ἐστίν εἶναι.
This is evident from PARMENIDES' identification of true Being with logical thought: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι, this is to say: all Being is being of thought and thought is thought of Being. But this hypostatization of the analytical relation of identity was ruled by the religious form-motive. It is true that this motive was not conceived here in the pure sense of the cultural religion of the Olympian Gods. Probably under Orphic influence it had been joined with the old ouranic motive of the worship of the celestial sphere. So the eternal Being was conceived of in the ideal spherical form of the firmament. PARMENIDES says that the powerful Anangkè and Dikè hold it in the ties of this form, preventing it from plunging itself into the deceitful stream of becoming and decay.
Since ANAXAGORAS and SOCRATES, however, the Greek form-motive freed itself from this ouranic deformation and regained its original meaning. Form was now conceived of as an ideal παράδειγμα, an ideal pattern for the form-giving activity of the divine Nous, the Demiurge of the world of becoming and decay.
In his dialogues Parmenides and Sophistes, PLATO introduced a dialectical Idea of Being which should synthesize the Eleatic conception of the ever resting ideal form of being and the Heraclitean principle of the ever flowing stream of life. This dialectical Idea was nothing but the analytical correlation of identity and diversity; the analytical relation: S is P implies: S is not Q, H, S, T and so on, if the latter exclude P.
PARMENIDES had absolutized the Idea of Being in conceiving it only in the analytical relation of identity. The principle of becoming and decay was called a not-being, which cannot be thought of. PLATO's dialectical Idea of Being was intended to synthesize positive and negative Being, the ὄν and the μὴ ὄν, and consequently the principles of form and matter. So the principle of becoming could participate in the dialectical Idea of Being. We have seen that in the dialogue Philebus all genesis is conceived of in the teleological sense of genesis eis ousian, a becoming to a form of being which gives expression to the divine Idea of the good and the beautiful. In this way the Eleatic determinations of Being by unity and verity were completed by those of goodness and beauty, and the dialectical Idea of Being was to embrace the general distinction of form and matter, peras and apeiron. This was the origin of the analogical concept of being which in Aristotelian and especially in scholastic metaphysics acquired a central and fundamental position. But it could not overcome the ultimate antithesis in the religious form-matter motive of Greek thought for lack of a higher point of departure for a real synthesis.
Consequently it lacked any relation to the radical unity of meaning (in the central, religious sphere). This unity, however, is the ultimate point of reference of all modal diversity and inter-modal coherence between the different aspects of temporal experience.
Therefore the analogical fundamental concept of 'being' could not offer any guidance to philosophical thought confronted with undeniable states of affairs within the modal structures of meaning.
Analogical concepts in principle lacking any relation to the cosmic time-order and to the radical unity of meaning, cannot be the foundation of our inquiry into these structures. From the outset they inevitably lead theoretical thought to levelling the modal structures of the aspects within which the analogical moments are discovered.
The relation of analogy, expressed in these modal structures, points to the inter-modal coherence of meaning determined by the cosmic order of time. It also points to the radical unity of the human ego as the religious centre of experience, and to the Divine Origin. It has no meaning without an order determining its sense and pointing beyond the modal diversity towards its radical identity transcending theoretical thought. An undetermined analogy of being is meaningless and unable to found any modal determination of a scientific concept.
In the metaphysical doctrine of analogia entis the 'transcendental determinations and distinctions' of the fundamental concept of 'being' are themselves of an analogical character [2].
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[2] In his Critique of Pure Reason (Transcendental Logic § 12) KANT has attempted to reduce these transcendental determinations (those of unity, verity and goodness) to the categories of unity, plurality and totality of his transcendental logic. According to him, they are nothing but these categories, conceived apart from their a priori relation to sensory experience and consequently taken in a merely formal-logical sense. This reduction is very artificial, especially the attempt to reduce 'verity', as a transcendental determination of Being, to KANT's category of plurality, and 'goodness' to the category of totality. In addition, KANT was not aware of the fact that his categories of quantity are nothing but analogical concepts, as will be explained in our further enquiry.
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This shows that the vicious circle is closed here. The cause is that in this speculative metaphysics, in its pretended autonomy, attempts are made to exceed the limits of meaning. The speculative concept, applied in this procedure, is intended to embrace both the Being of God and the meaning of creation.
It is true that the fundamental difference of meaning implied in the analogical concept of being is related to the essential difference between the things participating in it. But the vicious circle in this metaphysics lies in the fact that this difference is supposed to depend on the analogical concept of 'being' itself. This concept is to embrace both the essential differences between the 'substances' and those between their 'accidents'. This means that an undetermined analogy is laid at the foundation of all categorical determinations of being. The latter are consequently involved in the same lack of determinateness, both the fundamental category of substance and each of its accidents. In other words, the ontological analogy is conceived apart from the modal diversity of meaning. This diversity determines the transcendental horizon of theoretical thought itself, and thereby the limits to which the analogical concept is bound, if it is to have any meaning. The ontological analogy cannot be its own foundation; it must be founded in a cosmic order determining its sense in the inter-modal coherence of the different aspects.
For this reason the relation of analogy must be investigated within the cadre of the modal structures of meaning, which are determined by this order. It should be considered on the factual basis of undeniable states of affairs presenting themselves in the fundamental analogical concepts of scientific thought.
The latter give theoretical expression to the inter-modal coherence between the different aspects of human experience and empirical reality.
We shall begin with the description of these states of affairs accessible to everybody who is acquainted with theoretical terminology and with the difficulties implied in the theoretical distinction of the different modal aspects of meaning. A special difficulty in this description is the lack of a uniform terminology in the different languages and the linguistic ambiguity of words that may also have a metaphorical sense. This is the reason why, apart from the fundamental problem with which we are concerned here, the idea of a scientific alphabet of thought in the form of a symbolic logic has won so many adherents.
Why symbolic logic is not serviceable in our examination of the analogical concepts.
At first sight symbolic logic seems to be indispensable. It replaces words by a formal symbolic denotation, free from the ambiguities and irregularities of structure inherent in the different languages. It is intended to enable us to give exact formulation to scientific concepts and propositions of any kind, and to provide us with exact criteria as to their meaningfulness or lack of meaning.
But the very fact that this method of denotation can only be related to the logical form of propositions, classes and predicates with abstraction of their non-logical meaning-aspects, renders symbolic logic unserviceable in our present inquiry. We now have to investigate analogical expressions inherent in the denotation of the fundamental scientific concepts related to the inter-modal coherence of the modal aspects. This is to say, the modal meaning-structures and their interrelations are at issue. The inquiry into the latter is fundamental, also for formal logic.
Logistic is in constant danger of disregarding the modal limits of logical meaning, particularly in its inter-modal relation to the mathematical and linguistic aspects. Especially in the different trends of 'scientific empiricism' the opinion is defended that there is a logical unity of scientific language [3].
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[3] An important representative of this opinion was O. NEURATH (✞1945), who stimulated the publication of the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, the first part of which appeared in two volumes under the title 'Foundations of the Unity of Science'. The periodical 'Erkenntnis' (publ. since 1930), now continued as 'Journal of Unified Science', is the central review of this movemcnt, which also has many adherents in the Warsaw school, the Cambridge school for Analytic Philosophy, and the Berlin Society for Scientific Philosophy.
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The concepts of the different branches of science are not considered to be of fundamentally different kinds, but to belong to one coherent system. But this opinion depends on an uncritical pre-supposition, inadequately called 'physicalism' [4].
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[4] Cf. the statement of LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, the author of the famous Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: "The right method, properly speaking, would be the following: to say nothing except what can be said. Consequently propositions of natural science — that is to say something that has nothing to do with philosophy — and if somebody else wants to say something metaphysical we must always show that he has not given meaning to certain signs in his propositions." ["Die richtige Methode der Philosophic wäre eigentlich die: Nichts zu sagen, als was sich sagen lässt, also Sätze der Naturwissenschaft — also etwas, was mit Philosophie nichts zu tun hat —, und dann immer, wenn ein anderer etwas Metaphysisches sagen wollte, ihm nachzuweisen, dass er gewissen Zeichen in seinen Sätzen keine Bedeutung gegeben hat." (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London 1922, prop. 6. 53).] I have called the term 'physicalism' inadequate for this movement, because its sensualistic interpretation of physics does not agree with the meaning of the scientific propositions of natural science.
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According to it, every descriptive term in the language of science (taken in its widest sense) is connected with terms designating sensorily observable properties of things. This implies that in any description of undeniable states of affairs in the modal structures of the different aspects of human experience, these data are immediately reduced either to metaphors in linguistic expressions, or to formal-analytic relations, or to relations between sensory impressions.
The unity of scientific language intended here is acquired at the cost of a fundamental disturbance of the modal aspects to which the basic concepts of the different sciences are related.
The fundamental problem of the analogical concepts in scientific thought is eliminated in an uncritical manner, if the analysis and verification of these concepts is based on formal logic and the sensory aspect of human experience alone.
An adequate designation of the fundamental analogical concepts should give expression both to the inter-modal coherence and to the modal qualification of the analogical moments manifesting this coherence. Every modern language has found its own ways to designate these fundamental analogical concepts of the different branches of science.
The linguistic ambiguity of words in common parlance seems to be overcome by ascribing to the terms a special scientific meaning. But this does not guarantee real agreement on their signification. For the states of affairs concerning the modal meaning-structures to which the analogical concepts refer, are not explicitly examined in a philosophical manner.
As soon as philosophy attempts to account for these states of affairs, it will arrive at different interpretations depending on the different transcendental basic Ideas which lie at the foundation of philosophical thought. As a matter of fact these philosophical
interpretations always rule the scientific use of the analogical concepts, either consciously or unconsciously. But for the sake of an adequate description of the states of affairs to which they really refer, it is necessary to consider them for a moment apart from these interpretations. Otherwise under the influence of philosophical prejudices one runs the risk of prematurely eliminating the problems involved.
The ambiguity of pre-theoretic terminology and the psychological study of the 'significa'.
It will be clear why the ambiguity in the pre-scientific use of terms does not concern us in this context. Our inquiry exclusively refers to the modal structures of meaning. Pre-theoretical experience does not explicitly distinguish the modal aspects as such; it conceives them only implicitly within the typical total structures of individuality. Therefore pre-theoretical terms are not the subject of our present inquiry.
Neither are we concerned here with a study of the 'significa' in a psychological sense, directed to an analysis of the volitional, emotional, indicative and formal elements in the subjective act of designation and to an enquiry into the so-called 'spreading of signification'. These examinations may be very important, but they cannot give a solution to the problem of the analogical basic concepts in the different branches of science.
For the purpose of our present investigations I shall put down a number of different scientific expressions denoting fundamental analogical concepts. Provisionally I do not make any attempt at systematic arrangement. As a rule these expressions are unhesitatingly used without any account being given of the modal structures of meaning they refer to.
Some examples of scientific expressions denoting fundamental analogical concepts. The original and the analogical use of numerical terms.
The scientific terms 'number' and 'quantity' have an original mathematical signification. They can be used in arithmetic without a special qualifying adjective denoting their general modal sense. The arithmetical adjectives 'rational', 'irrational', 'negative', 'positive', 'real' 'complex', etc. do not refer to different modal aspects.
But when we speak of 'unity', 'Multiplicity' and 'totality' in logic, it is necessary to qualify these terms by the adjective 'logical'. A logical unity and multiplicity is not an arithmetical one, but has an inner coherence with the latter. A concept, viewed in its analytical aspect, is a logical unity in a multiplicity of logical characteristics. This multiplicity can be indicated by a number. By means of the analytical relation of implication [5] this multiplicity is synthesized to the logical unity of a concept. This relation is not an arithmetical one, although it cannot have any logical meaning without its coherence with originally numerical relations.
The same holds good as to the logical 'totality' of a propositional form (e.g.: All S imply P).
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[5] The relation of implication is taken here in a wider sense than is usual in logistic, viz. in the sense of analytical inclusion.
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Jurisprudence also handles the terms 'unity and 'multiplicity' in a special modal sense. In a contract between two persons there are two volitional declarations. They are juridically joined to one juridical fact. There may be a concurrence of two, three, or more legal facts in one real deed. This legal multiplicity does not have an intrinsically quantitative sense, although extrinsically it can be indicated by a number. The legal relations between different facts are no numerical relations proper, since they are ruled by juridical norms. The question whether two or more facts are juridically to be viewed as one or more depends on legal standards alone. A legal subject is a unity in an immeasurable multiplicity of relations. It is always necessary in this case to qualify the terms one, two, three, etc. by the modal adjective 'juridical', if the jurist wants to avoid the confusion between his own numerical concept and that of arithmetic.
The reason is that there is an insoluble coherence between the numerical and the juridical aspect, which does not affect their different modal meanings.
In ethics one speaks of a moral bi-unity of husband and wife in the marriage-bond. Social psychology speaks of a feeling of social unity in a multitude of men moved by the same ideal. Theology speaks of the Divine Tri-unity (the Trinity). In all these cases the numerical terms are obviously used in an analogical sense qualified by the modal adjective.
The original and the analogical use of the term space.
The same states of affairs are to be observed in the use of the word 'space'. It is a little confusing that this word has the form of a substantive. This evokes the idea that space is a thing, or, in the metaphysical turn of thought, that it is a substance.
There can evidently not exist a real thing corresponding to the term 'space'. There is only a modus, a modality of existence manifesting itself in modal relations of extension. The substantive had better be replaced by the adjective 'spatial'. But even in scientific usage the term 'space' has maintained its noun-form. We shall follow this custom without losing sight of the fact that this noun can only denote a modus, and not a thing. The scientific term 'space' as such has a non-analogical modal meaning in pure geometry only. For the present we shall pass over in silence the fact that the formalization of modern geometry has resulted in eliminating 'space' in its pure, original modal sense. As a matter of fact, this is only a methodical instrument of formal analysis, whose philosophical pre-suppositions will be examined later on. This formalization does not affect the application of the formal axioms and theorems to spatial functions in their original sense. This is done as soon as mathematics is concerned with the specific spatial subject-matter of geometry. It is, however, a little confusing that formalized geometry has retained the term 'space' ('formal space', as CARNAP says). For here its meaning is only dependent on the formal axioms accepted a priori. It does not at all explicitly refer to the spatial aspect of experience in its original modal sense, although it will appear from our later analysis of the modal structures that formal logic, too, implies a spatial analogy. This purely formal use of the term is unserviceable in an inquiry into the original modal meaning of space. It may be true that the latter is not identical with 'Euclidean space', but it does not allow of any formalizing which would even eliminate its modal structure.
Therefore it is necessary to abandon any formalization of pure geometry in the descriptive stage of our examination concerning the original and the analogical use of scientific terms denoting fundamental scientific concepts.
In pure, but not formalized geometry the term 'space' can be used without an adjective qualifying its modal sense. The adjectives two-, three-, four- or n-dimensional, Euclidean and non-Euclidean do not concern different modal aspects of meaning, no more than the adjectives topological, projective or metrical. They all refer to one and the same modal aspect delimiting the field of pure geometry in its non-formalized sense.
The empiricist trend in mathematics is bound to deny this and to assert that sensory space is the original datum. This epistemological pre-supposition, however, is not relevant to this descriptive stage of our enquiry. For the present the only question is: which branch of science can use the term 'space' without an adjective denoting its fundamental modal sense? The answer is that only pure geometry, apart from its formalization, can do so. It is true that we hear of 'pure' or 'mathematical' space. These adjectives, however, do not add anything to the modal meaning of spatiality in its non-analogical sense. For 'pure' geometry (in its non formalized meaning) finds its special modal field of research in the original spatial aspect alone.
Physics, however, cannot use the fundamental concept of 'space' without adding the qualifying adjective 'physical'; psychology has to add the qualifying adjective 'sensory' (visual, tactile, auditory); jurisprudence speaks of a legal space of validity with reference to legal norms; economics uses the term 'space' with a modal economic qualification, etc. In all these cases the word no longer has the same modal signification. Science is here involved in an analogical use of terms which requires a general delimitation of their intended modal sense, if they are to be serviceable.
The fundamental meaning-moment which all the analogical concepts of space refer to, is doubtless that of extension. But the extensive relations are qualified here in different modal ways.
There can be no question of a metaphorical use of the word 'space' in these modal qualifications. If there were a metaphor, the term in its scientific use could simply be replaced by another word or by a combination of terms without any spatial signification. But this is impossible. Although there is doubtless a modal difference of meaning between purely mathematical and objective sensory space, no psychologist can do without the term in its modal-psychical qualification. Rather he will maintain that sensory psychical space is 'real', whereas purely mathematical space is nothing but a logical construction. As observed, this would amount to a philosophical interpretation of the states of affairs we are confronted with. It would be premature in this descriptive phase of our inquiry, and it would disregard the complexity of the theoretical problems implied in the use of analogical concepts. It is not permitted to ignore the great modal diversity of meaning inherent in the word 'space' in its analogical scientific use.
As will be shown in more detail in our later investigations, the physical world-space is neither purely mathematical, nor sensory psychical. The same can be said with reference to historical, economical, aesthetic, juridical space, etc. All these modalities of extension cannot be of a sensory psychical character. Physical world-space in principle exceeds the horizon of sensory perception, although it has an inner relation to sensory extension. The remaining modalities mentioned here are no doubt founded in sensory space, but precisely in their special modal meaning they are not perceptible to the eye of sense.
The term territory (German: Gebiet), for instance, has an analogical spatial sense related to human command and legal competence. We can perceive a piece of ground with our eyes, but we cannot perceive in this way a territory of command and competence. The latter can only be signified (for instance through milestones or a national flag). A ship navigating under the Dutch flag is Dutch territory, wherever it may be. We know this only by the flag designating the nationality of the vessel, and from our knowledge of the rules of international law. Here the modal relations of extensiveness disclose a super-sensuous meaning and are subjected to special modal laws [6].
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[6] This will be explained in greater detail later on in our analysis of the modal structures of meaning.
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There must exist a close inter-modal meaning-coherence between the different modal significations of the word 'space'. This coherence finds its terminological expression either in the use of the word with or without special modal qualifications, or in specific nouns denoting space in a particular modal sense.
The original and the analogical use of the term economy.
Another example of the analogical modal use of a scientific term is supplied by the word 'economy'. Its foundational (non-analogical) scientific meaning is the sparing or frugal mode of administering scarce goods, implying an alternative choice of their destination with regard to the satisfaction of different human needs. The adjectives 'sparing' and 'frugal' do not have the limited sense of the economical term 'saving' (said of money for instance). They are only the correlatives of 'scarce' and refer to our awareness that an excessive or wasteful satisfaction of a particular need at the expense of other more urgent needs is uneconomical [7].
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[7] 'Uneconomical' is of course not the same as 'non-economical'. The latter adjective would mean 'not belonging to the economical sphere', whereas an 'uneconomical' manner of behaviour can occur only within the economical aspect.
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Economy demands the balancing of needs according to a plan, and the distribution of the scarce means at our disposal according to such a plan. In this fundamental sense the term is used in the science of economics, in which the word economy requires no further modal qualification.
Logic, however, uses this term in a logical sense, in its 'principle of logical economy' (das "denkökonomische Prinzip") and is obliged to denote this analogical meaning by the qualifying modal adjective [8].
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[8] ERNST MACH has omitted this qualifying adjective in the scientific-logical use of the term 'principle of economy'. But it cannot be denied that in economics this principle has a quite different meaning and that only here it can disclose its original sense.
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In linguistic science we speak of 'economy of speech', or 'linguistic economy'. It is very remarkable that neither logical nor linguistic economy are found in pre-theoretical thought and in primitive languages respectively. They occur in a scientific and developed stage of thought and language only. These states of affairs are highly important to our analysis of the modal structures of meaning, although they have not found the philosophical interest they deserve.
The same remark applies to the use of the term 'economy' in its modal qualification by an adjective denoting the aspect of social intercourse: conventional or ceremonial economy is not found in primitive society, but in developed social life only.
In the present context one should also pay attention to the use of the term in a technical sense. Economists make a sharp distinction between economy, in its original scientific meaning, and technique. They deny that the principle of economy which is applied to the solution of a technical problem has a scientific economic sense.
There is indeed a modal difference of meaning between economy in its original scientific sense and in its technical meaning. The latter is not ruled by the economical viewpoint proper but by that of technical control of the material to the highest degree of efficiency. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable coherence of meaning between economy proper and the technical sense of the term. The fundamental meaning-moment which every economical analogy refers to is that of frugality, the avoidance of superfluous or excessive ways of reaching our aim. And again we are confronted with the fact that on the part of technique this inter-modal coherence with the economical aspect is only developed at a higher stage of culture. Primitive technique lacks economy in this analogical sense.
On the other hand the term 'economy' is used in a modal aesthetical sense (cf. the Greek adage μηδὲν ἂγαν) irrespective of the difference between the primitive or the higher developed character of works of art. This is also the case with the term 'legal economy' [9] designating prevention of excessive reactions against tort or crime, and the subjection of these reactions to the principle of juridical proportion. (This is a new analogical term, since proportion has an originally mathematical meaning.) Even the primitive principle of talion implies this juridical economy, and it is thereby sharply distinguished from any form of orderless revenge.
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[9] This term is often used in the sense of legal technique; but this sense is not intended here.
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I must again stress the undeniable coherence of meaning between the analogical and the non-analogical use of the term 'economy' excluding any idea of arbitrariness. The essential thing in all this is the scientific use of a term which in its proper sense denotes an original modal meaning, but in its analogical sense is qualified by a specific modal adjective. This adjective denotes another modal aspect which, by means of an analogical moment of its structure, reveals its intermodal coherence with the original modus.
The original and the analogical use of the terms control, command, mastery or power.
This introduction will be concluded with a short examination of the analogical scientific use of the term command or control (German: Macht, Beherrschung)[cf. Irish: smacht; Scots Gaelic: smachd (FMF)].
There are many synonyms of these terms. In the first Dutch edition of this work I always used the Dutch words 'macht' or 'beheersing'. In Vol. I of the second (English) edition I choose the English term 'power'. But the latter is also used in the sense of 'faculty', and this latter term has no original modal signification, because it does not refer to a special modal aspect of human experience. In the analysis of the modal meaning-structures I shall therefore avail myself of the word 'power' only in connection with the terms 'command', 'control', 'mastery'.
It is very important to choose the right terms in this inquiry, because many readers appear to experience great difficulty in distinguishing accurately between the modal aspects of meaning and the typical structures of individuality embracing and individualizing them. They have a natural inclination to identify the modal aspects with concrete phenomena which function in them. The fundamental difference between the modal 'how' and the concrete 'what' is easily lost sight of. A Dutch psychologist asked me, for instance, if it would not be necessary to introduce an aspect of human behaviour in my theory of the modal law-spheres. He did not see that human behaviour cannot be a modal aspect, because it is a concrete activity which in the nature of the case functions in all aspects of experience alike.
Such misunderstandings would be increased by using terms in my explanation which can denote either a modal aspect of meaning, or a concrete something, a 'this' or a 'that'. But it is very difficult indeed to evade this ambiguity in every English term employed here. Therefore I must always ask my readers to look behind the words for the states of affairs which I want to denote by them. Just as in the case of the word 'space', the term 'control' (= command, or power), in its noun-form cannot mean a 'thing', but only a modus, viz. a modality of social relationships implying a manner of exercising social influence or of controlling things, respectively. In the social sciences the word has different modal significations that should be sharply distinguished from 'natural force' and psychical suggestion. But the meaning of 'mastery' is foundational; it denotes cultural authority over persons or things, corresponding to a controlling manner of social form-giving according to a free project. In this original sense the term is used in the science of history, where it need not be qualified by an adjective denoting its specific modal meaning. As will be shown later on, the historical aspect of human experience, as such, is related to the development of human mastery, power, command or control in this non-analogical modal sense. The adjectives 'political', 'ecclesiastical' and the like do not denote other general modalities of meaning. They refer in history only to typical manifestations of command within the same modal aspect. Political power refers to the state, ecclesiastical power to the church. Both, state and church, are typical social structures of individuality, which as such function in all modal aspects of society alike, and can only individualize the modal meaning of the latter.
But when one speaks of logical command or control, the term refers to another modal aspect, viz. the analytical. Now the word acquires an analogical sense qualified by a special modal adjective. And here we again meet with a remarkable state of affairs, viz. the fact that logical control is not found in pre-theoretical thought, and that the analogical term has an indissoluble inter-modal coherence with the development of human command in its non-analogical historical sense.
By systematical theoretical concepts and propositions we really acquire a logical control of the field of inquiry. Pre-theoretical concepts and propositions lack this systematic character. Theoretical logic has its history, because it is involved in a process of logical moulding of the human mind, and in this actual process discloses cultural power in human society. The naïve pre-theoretical formation of concepts and the naïve use of logical principles show a uniform, unskilled character in the course of times and do not interest the student of history. But logical command is not itself mastery in its non-analogical historical sense. It is, as such, a modal logical meaning-figure, not an historical one. We shall return to this point in later examinations.
Jurisprudence handles a fundamental analogical modal concept denoted by the terms 'competency', 'legal power'. The Dutch term 'rechtsmacht' [cf. Irish 'smacht reachta' = 'rule of law' (FMF)] is more pregnant in its denotation of the specific modal qualification of the analogy, just as the French term 'pouvoir juridique' and the German 'rechtliche Macht'. The modal diversity of meaning between the non-analogical historical term 'command' or 'power', and the analogical term in its modal-juridical qualification, is not to be denied so long as the historicist or naturalist prejudices are eliminated.
It is a striking case of an evident disregard of the analogical character of the term 'power' in its modal-juridical qualification, when the famous German jurist GEORG JELLINEK identifies it with "rechtlich beschränkte Macht". For in this context he conceives the term "Macht" in its non-analogical historical sense. But the modal qualification 'juridical' cannot restrict the modal meaning of power or command in its original historical use. The antinomy in this interpretation of the analogical juridical term manifests itself in JELLINEK's well-known construction of legal power as a self-restriction of political power in its historical sense. This is a construction which also implies a confusion between the general modal juridical viewpoint and the sociological one directed to typical structures of individuality.
The fundamental analogical concept denoted by the German term "rechtliche Macht" has a normative legal sense, but it has an undeniable intermodal coherence of meaning with the term "Macht" in its non-analogical, historical-social meaning.
The true state of affairs referred to by this analogical relation is the following: in its modal juridical meaning 'power' is unilaterally founded in what is denoted by the general term 'power' (i.e. command) in the science of history. In the historical aspect this word has its original, non-analogical modal meaning. This is empirically proved by the fact that no juridical competency can maintain itself when the social [10] organs invested with it lose their social command or mastery in its original historical sense. Every realization of legal power pre-supposes an historical organization of command, and not vice versa.
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[10] The adjective 'social' is not used here in the specific modal sense of the aspect of intercourse, but in the general sense embracing all modal aspects of human society alike.
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One should also pay attention to the fact that this coherence of meaning between juridical power and historical command is realized even in primitive society. Consequently this realization is not restricted to the higher developed social order.
The same can be observed with regard to the other analogical modal concepts of power denoted by the terms 'aesthetical control', 'moral control', 'faith-power' etc. Their analogical modal significations are not to be confused with typical forms of historical power, if we want to prevent a general mixing up of the different modal aspects of meaning. An accurate analysis of all these significations is necessary. But in the present context every analysis is only provisional, because we have not yet developed our own theory about the modal structures of meaning.
In this introduction the only point is to establish undeniable states of affairs in the analogical use of scientific concepts. In the last analysis they are founded in the modal structures of meaning themselves and, as such, they are independent of subjective philosophical interpretations. The linguistic denotations of the fundamental analogical concepts demanded attention only insofar as they refer to these states of affairs which urge themselves upon the human mind. The latter reflect themselves in the structure of analogical scientific terms which is beyond any arbitrariness. In other words we do not want to develop a merely linguistic theory of significations.
Behind linguistic signification philosophy has to concentrate on the problem of the fundamental analogical modal concepts of the different branches of science.
The complexity of the analogical concepts.
This problem is in fact much more complicated than could appear in our introductory examinations. We have provisionally made a distinction between the analogical and the non-analogical or original scientific significations of the modal terms number, space, economy, command. Naturally this was only an arbitrary selection. The multiplicity of these modal terms is not at all exhausted by these few examples. But, what is still more important, a further analysis will show that the original modal concepts denoted by the non-analogical terms themselves contain analogical conceptual moments. This implies that analogical relationship is applied much more extensively in fundamental scientific concepts than could at first sight be supposed. This extremely complicated state of affairs should not be disregarded under the explicit or implicit influence of philosophical prejudices which demand the reduction of all fundamental concepts of the different branches of science to one and the same fundamental pattern.
Such prejudices imply a theoretical eradication of the modal structures of the different meaning-aspects, and are bound to lead astray the whole further scientific method of forming concepts and posing problems. Every philosophy must be confronted with the states of affairs to which the analogical modal concepts are related.
From a scientific viewpoint it is not permissible to develop an a priori philosophical theory concerning the coherence of the fundamental concepts of the different branches of science. The full complexity of the relevant states of affairs must first be examined in an accurate, unbiased manner. This is the really empirical way of philosophizing, viz. the attempt to give a philosophical account of the facts without mutilating their real meaning.
An empiricism which neglects the modal meaning-diversity of the different aspects of human experience is not entitled to claim the epithet 'scientific', because it eliminates the fundamental problem of the analogical concepts in scientific thought. It is merely a bad kind of a priorism and has nothing to do with symbolic logic, which as such is a splendid instrument of human thought. The question in what way we shall philosophically account for the states of affairs to which this conceptual analogy refers, will to a high degree depend on the transcendental basic Idea directing our theoretical reflection. For the problem of analogy here intended directly concerns the transcendental Idea regarding the inter-modal coherence and the mutual relation between the different modal aspects of human experience set asunder and opposed to one another in the theoretical 'Gegenstand-relation'.
The provisional elimination of the philosophical prejudices in the description of the 'states of affairs' and the influence of the religious starting-points in this stage of the inquiry. No ὲποχή in the phenomenological sense.
The preceding introductory examinations have stressed the necessity of a provisional elimination of philosophical prejudices so long as we are engaged in a pure description of the 'states of affairs' to be accounted for by philosophy. But in this context the same objection can be expected [as was] encountered in the transcendental critique of theoretical thought, developed in Vol. I. Does this methodical suspension of philosophical prejudices imply an elimination of the religious starting-points? If so, it would be necessary to accept a religious neutrality which contradicts at least the universal necessity of a religious basic motive with respect to theoretical inquiry. If not, the 'states of affairs' which should provide a common basis for philosophical discussion cannot satisfy this requirement.
My answer to this question is that the states of affairs described in the preceding introductory examinations urge themselves upon the human mind as soon as they have been detected, because they are really the same for everybody. But their discovery and the manner of description are not independent of a religious starting-point. For it is evident that the dialectical basic motives of immanence-philosophy must divert our attention from them, so that we have no concern in an exact description. Therefore I can agree without hesitation that the preceding inquiry into the states of affairs implied in the fundamental analogical concepts was not unprejudiced in a religious sense. But I must at the same time deny that this circumstance detracts from the fact that the 'states of affairs' here intended are a common basis for philosophical discussion.
I have granted repeatedly that other undeniable states of affairs have been detected in immanence-philosophy, that is to say under the influence of non-Christian basic motives. With reference to this point I do not claim a privileged position for a Christian philosophy which is ruled by the Biblical basic motive.
The ὲποχή [epoché] of the philosophical prejudices required in this preliminary stage of our examination is in a certain sense exactly the reverse of the transcendental-phenomenological ὲποχή in HUSSERL. For the latter pretends to imply a methodological elimination of the natural attitude of experience inclusive of that of the empirical sciences, and in the first place of the religious commitment. The phenomena are considered here as the result of a phenomenological constitution by the transcendental consciousness. In this constitution everything intendable as immanent or transcendent is supposed to be produced as an essentially intentional object (Gegenstand). It is evident that this transcendental-phenomenological 'reduction' of the world to an intentional objective correlate of the absolute transcendental ego implies a fundamental philosophical prejudice. In our conception of the methodological ὲποχή this prejudice should be eliminated in the preliminary stage of the inquiry into the states of affairs implied in the use of the fundamental analogical concepts.
It is impossible to eliminate the religious starting-point of theoretical thought. But it is not impossible to perform a provisional ὲποχή of all specific philosophical interpretations of the states of affairs which are to be established in a precise way before we try to account for them in a philosophical theory.
Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol II/ Part I/ Chapt 2/§ 1 pp 55-74)
