"Bòid nan Horatii" le Jacques-Louis DAVID (1784)
CAIBIDEIL II
PLANA RIANAIL AR RANNSACHAIDH NAS DOIMHNE AGUS SGRÙDADH NAS DLÙITHE AIR DÀIMH AN IDÈA CHOSMONÒMAICH RIS NA SAIDHEANSAN SPEISEALTA.
§ 1 - ROINNEAN MAS FHÌOR NA FEALLSANACHD RIANAIL ANN AN SOLAS A' GHRUNND-IDÈA THAR-CHEUMNAIL.
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CHAPTER II
THE SYSTEMATIC PLAN OF OUR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS AND A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA TO THE SPECIAL SCIENCES.
§ 1 - THE SO-CALLED DIVISIONS OF SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIGHT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA.
With this we have come to the end of our critical examination of the significance of the transcendental ground-Idea for all philosophical thought. We have reached the point where we can begin to develop the positive content of our philosophy. To this end we must first give an account of the plan which will determine the course of our future investigations.
The question arises as to whether or not we can employ the basic divisions of philosophic problems as they are made by immanence-philosophy.
The reply is in the negative. And this denial rests upon the fact that also the classification and formulation of problems in immanence-philosophy is intrinsically connected with its transcendental ground-Idea.
With respect to the systematic development of Humanistic philosophy we can state that the foundation of all systematic attempts at a classification of problems is rooted in both polar basic factors of the Humanistic ground-Idea: the ideal of science and that of personality, with their inherent postulates of continuity.
The fundamental significance of the transcendental ground-Idea for all attempts made in Humanistic immanence-philosophy to classify the problems of philosophy.
We have seen that both of these basic factors have dominated Humanistic philosophy since the Renaissance. Before the critical philosophy of KANT, however, they were not clearly isolated as a regulative principle for the systematic classification of philosophical problems. The Critique of Pure Reason fenced the first main field of philosophic inquiry: the epistemological foundation and limitation of the classic ideal of science (which is directed toward the "domination of nature"). The second main field of philosophical investigation is indicated by the Critique of Practical Reason, i.e. the critical foundation of autonomous ethics, according to the Humanistic ideal of personality. In connection with this latter Critique, KANT treats the philosophical problems of jurisprudence ("Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre") and of theology. The Critique of Teleological Judgment (Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft) investigates the philosophical problems of biology, history (1) and aesthetics and is thought of as a subjective synthesis between the two other critiques.
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(1) In my treatise Norm and Fact, published in the Dutch juridical quarterly "Themis" (1932), I have shown in detail that KANT's philosophy of history, particularly developed in his treatise Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), must be explained from the view-point of the "Critique of teleological Judgment" (published a few years after).
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In FICHTE we find a re-occurence of this basic division. He classified philosophy into a "Wissenschaftslehre" with a "theoretical" and a "practical" section. Upon this foundation was subsequently constructed the pantheistic metaphysics of absolute Being. In HEGEL's dialectical division of philosophy into logic, natural philosophy, and the philosophy of Spirit, it is not difficult to detect the influence of the same Humanistic ground-Idea.
As we have seen, pre-Kantian rationalistic Humanistic philosophy was completely under the influence of DESCARTES' program of a mathesis universalis. In the naturalistic branch (HOBBES) this program could only lead to an encyclopaedical systematizing of the sciences in a successive continuous procession, from the simple to the complex spheres of knowledge. This was done upon the basis of a mathematical logic and a so-called "prima philosophia". The method of thought of mathematical natural science was maintained in every field of philosophical investigation, in accordance with the continuity-postulate of the science-ideal. The same can be ascertained again in COMTE's positivism. In spite of their maintenance of the primacy of the science-ideal, we saw that, in the dualistic types of pre-Kantian metaphysics, a fundamental metaphysical cleft was made between natural philosophy, on the one hand, and metaphysical psychology and ethics, on the other.
CHRISTIAN WOLFF divided philosophy into two main fields: theoretical philosophy or metaphysics (including natural theology, psychology and physics), and practical philosophy.
Pre-Kantian empiristic philosophy could also accept a division into theoretical and practical sections. JOHN LOCKE, for example, considered philosophy (as a scientific system) to possess three main divisions: "physica" or natural philosophy, "practica" whose principal part constitutes ethics, and "semiotica", whose principal element consists of nominalistic logic (2).
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(2) Essays on Human Understanding IV, 21, § 1 fl.
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Even in the philosophy of the XXth Century, attempts at a systematic division continue to be made in accordance with the foundational structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-idea.
Thus we find that COHEN, the father of the neo-Kantian Marburg school, divides philosophy into three principal realms: "Logic of pure Knowledge", "Ethics of pure Will" and "Aesthetics of pure Feeling". Obviously this classification receives its orientation from KANT.
The neo-Kantian philosophy of values (RICKERT) divides the sphere of real nature from the sphere of ideal values. We have seen in part I, that it seeks to effect a subjective synthesis between the two spheres in the intermediary sphere of culture. The system of values which philosophy must give, according to this standpoint, is grounded in the fundamental distinction between theoretical and practical values. It is not difficult to recognize in this distinction the dualism between the science-ideal and the ideal of personality. Theoretical philosophy becomes a transcendental critique of natural science, practical philosophy a "Weltanschauungslehre".
WINDELBAND's opinion concerning the necessity of dividing philosophy into a theoretical and a practical section.
In his Introduction to Philosophy, WINDELBAND divided the philosophical material into theoretical problems (Wissensfragen) and the axiological ones (Wertfragen). In this context he observes: "The connection of both moments (i.e. of the theoretical and practical) is characteristic of philosophy to such a degree, that the division of its historical manifestations into different appropriate periods can be gained in the best manner from the change of the relations between these two. We see how with the Greeks that which is called philosophy originates from purely theoretical interest and methodically comes under the influence of the practical need, and we follow the triumph of the latter in the long periods during which philosophy essentially aims at being a doctrine of the redemption of man. With the Renaissance once more there comes to rule a preponderatingly theoretical striving and the Enlightenment again makes the results of the latter subservient to its practical cultural-ends: until in KANT, with impressive clarity, the intimate coherence between both sides of philosophy is realized and made understandable" (3).
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(3) Einleitung in die Philosophie, 2e Aufl., 1920, S. 19/20: "Die Verknüpfung beider Momente (i.e. "des theoretischen und praktischen") ist für die Philosophie so charakteristisch, dasz aus dem Wechsel der Beziehungen zwischen ihnen die Gliederung ihrer historischen Erscheinungen in sachgemäsz unterschiedene Perioden am besten gewonnen werden kann. Wir sehen das, was sich Philosophie nennt, im Griechentum aus rein theoretischem Interesse erwachsen und allmählich unter die Macht des praktischen Bedürfnisses kommen, und wir verfolgen den Triumph des letzeren in den langen Jahrhunderten, während deren die Philosophie wesentlich eine Lehre von der Erlösung des Menschen sein will. Mit der Renaissance kommt vom neuem ein vorwiegend theoretisches Bestreben zur Herrschaft, und dessen Ergebnisse stellt wieder die Aufklärung in den Dienst ihrer praktischen Kulturzwecke: bis dann in KANT der intime Zusammenhang zwischen beiden Seiten der Philosophie mit eindrucksvoller Deutlichkeit zum Bewusztsein und zum Verständnis gebracht wird."
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WINDELBAND summarily tries to justify this "foundational" distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy by conceiving it as founded upon the two sides of human nature, considered here as a "thinking" and "volitional-acting" being. But this explanation is not serious. For the so-called "practical" philosophy is as much theoretical as the "theoretical" one, and thinking can be either a practical or a theoretical act.
We quoted the preceding statement of WINDELBAND to demonstrate how completely dominating the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical is thought to be; it is viewed as not being peculiar to the Humanistic, but to the entire western immanence-philosophy.
It is, however, the polar tension between the ideal of science and that of personality, in the basic structure of the Humanistic ground-Idea, that gives this division its particular Humanistic sense.
The distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy in Greek thought.
The distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy was in fact already present in ancient Greek philosophy. It played a fundamental role since ARISTOTLE, and in the Middle Ages it was in many respects accepted without further reflection.
The reason for its adoption is readily understood, if we examine the Socratic trend in Greek thought. The path of the latter had been paved by the sophists.
As we have seen in our transcendental critique, Greek thought was dominated by the religious form-matter motive. And this motive determined the central content of the various forms of its transcendental ground-Idea.
In the Ionic natural philosophy the matter-motive of the old religion of life had the primacy up until ANAXAGORAS. In the transcendental Idea of Origin, the divine ἄρχή was conceived of as the formless and impersonal stream of life. And in most instances it was identified with what was later called a mobile Element (e.g. water, air, or fire). In ANAXIMANDER, however, it was simply referred to as the invisible ἄπειρον (the formless or unlimited). Under the influence of this transcendental Idea of Origin, man and his culture were viewed under the same perspective as the rest of things, arising in a specific form out of the womb of the eternal flowing stream of life. Man and all things are condemned to death and decay because "form" is ungodly and perishable.
In opposition to the matter-motive the Eleatic school posited its counter pole, viz. the principle of form. It developed a metaphysical ontology in which the all-inclusive form of being was qualified as the only true, eternal, and unchangeable entity. However, the form-motive is here still orientated to the old ouranic (4) religion of nature.
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(4) "Ouranic" (derived from "Ouranos") means what is related to the celestial sphere (the "celestial Gods", i.e. the sun and the stars).
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As a result, this dialectical trend did not lead Greek thought to critical self-reflection concerning the central position of man in the cosmos. This latter did not occur until the form-motive of the culture-religion acquired the primacy in Greek thought. Under its leadership interest was directed to human culture and in particular to the Greek polis as the bearer of the Olympian culture-religion. In PROTAGORAS, the father of Sophistic, this dialectical trend was accompanied by a sceptical criticism of natural philosophy and metaphysical ontology, a criticism which involved the whole of theoretical knowledge. It drew the most extreme conclusions from the matter-motive of the older nature-philosophy (5).
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(5) Neither the Ionic philosophy of nature, nor HERACLITUS had done this. For in the physis, i.e. the process of growth and decay, they had always accepted a fixed norm and proportion. They derived the latter from the motive of form. In other words, they did not eliminate the form-motive, but merely ascribed primacy to the motive of matter.
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If everything is in a constant state of flux and change, this is also true of theoretical truth. There is no fixed norm for the latter. Individual man in his constantly changing subjectivity is the measure of all things. This devaluation of theoretical knowledge of nature had its back-ground in the shift of interest to human culture and in particular to the Greek polis as the sphere of human action. In opposition to theoretical philosophy, which is valueless in itself, was posited a practical philosophy, not concerned with truth, but with what is useful and beneficial to man. In particular its task was to furnish practical knowledge necessary for politics. For by means of its paideia, the polis, as the bearer of the culture-religion, gives form to human nature, which in itself does not possess any law or form, because it is entirely subjected to the ever flowing stream of becoming and decay.
The sophistic distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy in the light of the Greek motive of form and matter.
Thus, for the first time, a fundamental opposition was introduced between theoretical and practical philosophy, and this opposition was entirely dominated by the dualistic Greek ground-motive. The question as to whether primacy was to be ascribed to the motive of form or to that of matter was expressly viewed by SOCRATES in the light of critical self-knowledge. According to the testimony of PLATO in the dialogue PHAEDRUS — which, if not authentic, nevertheless suits the Socratic spirit perfectly — SOCRATES wished to know, if his ego was related to TYPHON, the wild and incalculable God of destructive storms (a genuine mythological symbol of the matter-motive), or whether he was in possession of a simple (Apollinian) nature, to which form, order, and harmony are proper.
Just as PROTAGORAS, SOCRATES ascribed primacy to the form-motive of the culture-religion. His interests also were entirely directed to culture, ethics, and politics. He was solely concerned in human action. But before everything else he wished to regain fixed norms in philosophical theoria as to the good, the true, and the beautiful. These had been undermined by the critique of the sophists, a critique exclusively inspired by the matter-principle and loosened from the principle of form. The criterion of utility, which PROTAGORAS had accepted for practical
philosophy, was in the last analysis itself caught in the matter-principle of eternal flux and change.
Therefore, SOCRATES wished to elevate practical philosophy to an epistèmè, a science. The virtues must be comprehended in a concept. Every concept of an ἀρετή however, remains enclosed in the theoretical diversity of the normative aspects. It must therefore be concentrically directed toward the divine Idea of the good and the beautiful, as the origin of all form in the cosmos. This orientation of the scientific method in ethics to the divine form-principle gave a teleological direction to practical philosophy.
All temporal laws and ordinances and all things in the cosmos must in the last instance aim at expressing the Idea of the good and beautiful, according to which the divine nous formed the cosmos.
A concept is valueless if it does not inform us of the good of the thing being defined. A concept has value in SOCRATES' practical philosophy only if it informs us of the ἀρετή, the use of a thing. This Socratic Idea of aretè implies in the last analysis the teleological relation to the divine Idea of the good and beautiful.
Meanwhile, SOCRATES sharply emphasized the theoretical character of his "practical" philosophy. He did not countenance the sophistical opposition of theoria and praxis (6).
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(6) According to XENOPHON, Memor. 3, 9, 4, SOCRATES himself did not yet distinguish the theoretical sophia from the practical σωφροσύνη (morality).
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The distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy is not again significant until PLATO and ARISTOTLE. For even though they took full cognizance of SOCRATES' contribution to thought, they again became interested in the problems of metaphysics and natural philosophy.
Since primacy was now ascribed to the form-motive of the culture-religion, the motive of matter was deprived of all divine attributes and the deity was now conceived of as pure nous ("pure form" in ARISTOTLE) .
The Socratic influence on Greek thought directed the latter toward the self-hood. And as soon as this critical self-reflection appeared in Greek philosophy, the characteristic of man which distinguishes him from other beings bound to the principle of matter was now sought in the nous (reason). This nous was conceived of as theoretical thought.
Besides ethical and political questions, the theoria was again concerned with ontological problems and with those of nature. Consequently, the need arose to introduce a distinction in human reason itself. Henceforth, the misleading opposition between theoretical and practical reason was introduced. This distinction is really misleading here! For by "practical reason" (phronèsis in PLATO, nous praktikos in ARISTOTLE) was not in the least understood pre-theoretical naïve thought, insofar as it is concerned with practice. In principle, both PLATO and ARISTOTLE held to the Socratic view that only theoretical insight into the good can protect human action from being dominated by sensory passions and desires, which originate in the "matter" of human nature. From this view-point the distinction between theoretical and practical reason cannot be founded in the subjective act of thought, but exclusively in the Gegenstand of its logical function.
The philosophical ethics and political theory of PLATO and ARISTOTLE intend to give theoretical insight into objective norms for ethics and politics. It is indifferent to the inner nature of philosophic investigation that it intends to give theoretical information to practical life. For every theoretical investigation can be utilized by the praxis. This even applies to mathematics and physics which do not have any normative aspects as their "Gegenstand".
The Sophists referred theoretical knowledge to the matter-principle and thus denied any universally valid standard for theoretical truth. Consequently, only on this standpoint could the antithesis between theoretical and practical philosophy have a fundamental significance for the mode of thought as such. PROTAGORAS maintained a pragmatic standpoint with respect to philosophy: Theoria does not have any value in itself. Its value lies solely in the practical aim that it serves, namely, in politics.
Naturally, this extreme nominalistic standpoint cannot recognize norms for praxis which are not conventional. PROTAGORAS' sophistic criterion of utility is purely subjective, but not indiviualistic, as in his epistemology. The nomos, established by the polis, is the common opinion about good and evil, not that of an individual. It has the task to give cultural form to human physis through its paideia. But, as we have seen, the principle of form is subject here to the matter-principle of the eternal flux and change. PROTAGORAS' evolutionary philosophy of culture is a clear proof of this. The nomos is here only a higher phase of development of the lawless physis.
Only with this background in mind can a proper understanding be gained of the realistic standpoint of PLATO and ARISTOTLE.
The axiological turn of this distinction. The primacy of theoretical philosophy versus the primacy of practical philosophy.
In addition to distinguishing between them, Greek thought immediately arranges theoretical and practical philosophy in an axiological order. In the realist-idealistic systems of PLATO and ARISTOTLE a higher value was ascribed to theoretical philosophy. On the contrary, the naturalist-nominalistic systems which proceeded from the Sophistic standpoint, though they were also influenced by SOCRATES' Idea of virtue, depreciated pure theoria and ascribed exclusive value to practical philosophy.
In the last analysis, this axiological ordering of theoretical and practical philosophy was connected here with the transcendental ground-Idea of Greek philosophy. For, as we have seen, the distinction acquired an entirely different sense in modern Humanistic philosophy.
According to SEXTUS EMPIRICUS (Adv. Math. 7, 16), the first explicit division of philosophy into ethica, physica and logica was made by PLATO's pupil XENOCRATES who directed the academy after SPEUSIPPOS.
In his Topica (7) ARISTOTLE provisionally took over this method of classification.
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(7) Top. A 14, 105b. 199 sq.
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He subsumed all philosophical problems that are related to the universal under λογικαί. The specific physical or specific ethical do not receive any attention in this general branch of philosophy. According to this point of view, in addition to including formal logic, λογικαί encompasses metaphysics.
If we observe the place here accorded to logic in this wide sense, the influence of the metaphysical (speculative) immanence-standpoint is clearly visible. It is evident insofar as it is related to the metaphysical-universal in its supposed elevation above the cosmic diversity. Metaphysical logic is foundational both for natural and ethical philosophy.
In a later part of his Topic and in his Metaphysics ARISTOTLE introduced the main division between practical and theoretical philosophy next to which he placed the Poiètikè, a third main division of philosophy. According to this new division, metaphysics, as the science of the first grounds of being (8), became theoretical philosophy κατ' ἐξοχήν.
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(8) In this later division ARISTOTLE did not give any place to the Analytica. The Peripatetici explained this by saying that Logic only functions as an organ of philosophy proper.
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ARISTOTLE ascribed to theoretical metaphysics a higher value than to the other branches of philosophical inquiry; he did so, according to the object of knowledge (9).
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(9) Metaph. K 7, 1064b, 5b: βελτίων δὲ καὶ χείρων ἑκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ὀικεῑον ἐπιστητόν.
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Practical and "poetical" philosophy possess less value; the former is directed toward ethical and political human activity and the latter toward human creation in technique and art. How is this higher appreciation of metaphysical theoria to be understood?
Insofar as metaphysics investigates the absolute "formal" ground of being, it is theology (θεολογική). Theoretical reason furnishes us with knowledge of the pure nous as divine "actus purus". And the latter, as Archè is considered to be the final "formal" ground of being of the cosmos, whereas "pure matter" is the original principle of becoming and continuous change. Theoretical metaphysics, therefore, takes axiological precedence of all practical and "poetical" knowledge. Practical philosophy has its foundations in theoretical philosophy in this metaphysical sense. With this is closely connected the distinction made in ethics between the "dianoetic" and the ethical virtues. The former point to theoretical and the latter to practical life. The "dianoetic" virtues are the highest, because they are directed toward theoretical knowledge itself. A life devoted only to sensory enjoyment is bestial. An ethical-political life is human, but a life devoted to theory is divine. In it the divine in man, the nous poiètikos (which is planted in him θύραθεν, that is to say, from outside) reveals itself in its purest form. It is evident that this whole appreciation of pure theory depends upon the religious primacy of the Greek form-motive. Pure theoria is the only way to a real contact with the divine "forma pura". The transcendental Idea of Origin has two poles: pure Form versus pure matter.
This Aristotelian axiological view of theory and practice was accepted by THOMAS AQUINAS. He also placed the "dianoetic" virtues above the practical and ethical ones.
The primacy of practical knowledge in the naturalistic-nominalistic trends of Greek immanence-philosophy.
In giving pre-eminence to theoretical philosophy, the metaphysical-idealistic systems of Greek philosophy held to the reality of the ideal forms. In contrast, naturalistic-nominalist Greek philosophy, influenced by the sophistic subjectivism and the Socratic Idea of virtue, ascribed primacy to practical philosophy. Perhaps it is better to say that they rejected all pure "theoria". The Megaric, Cynic, and Cyrenaic schools apparently did not distinguish between theoretical and practical philosophy, nor does one find in them the division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic. Nevertheless, they concentrated their entire philosophical interest on ethics, to which logic (dialectic) was made subservient.
EPICURUS divided philosophy into a canonic (logical), a physical and an ethical section. The philosophy of nature was treated only for the sake of its ethical utility, namely, insofar as it could liberate the soul from the terrors of superstition and could prepare it for the hedonistic enjoyments of cultural life in wise self-restriction. It accomplishes this task by furnishing an insight into the rigid mechanical coherence of the events of nature, considered as an interaction of atoms in the void. In my Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy (1949, vol. I) I have shown that this Greek atomism has nothing to do with the modern atomistic view of matter, but originated from the Greek form-matter-motive. The systems of the Stoics also followed the traditions of the Academy in dividing philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics. Primacy was, here too, ascribed to practical philosophy (10), even though the philosophic physics (which, in a nominalistic strain, had replaced Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics) occupied the highest position among the theoretical sciences, because as "physical theology" it should lead to knowledge of God (11).
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(10) Cf. WINDELBAND, Gesch. der alten Phil., 2e Aufl., S. 184.
(11) This theological preference for theoretical philosophy of nature is maintained by POSIDONIUS in the middle Stoa, and by SENECA in the late Stoa.
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The old Stoic view of nature and deity was also completely dominated by the Greek form-matter motive. God is the ever flowing life-stream in its dialectical identity with the form-principle: he is the primal fire and the Logos of nature. It is the task of ethics to teach us how to live according to this Logos.
In Stoic ethics the primacy of practical philosophy is clearly revealed, where — in sharp contrast to the Aristotelian view — it teaches, that the highest human task is found in moral action rather than in theoretical contemplation. All virtues are practical and moral in nature; there is no place for pure "dianoetic" ones as in ARISTOTLE. ZENO traced them back to Φρόνησις.
According to PLUTARCH, CHRYSYPPUS opposed the philosophers who viewed theoretical life as an end in itself. He contended that such a view was basically a refined hedonism. It was only agreed that in moral life the correct πρᾶξις, in conformity with reason, rests upon the θεωρία and blends with it.
In Greek immanence-philosophy, the necessity of ascribing primacy to the theoretical or to the practical reason is connected with the dialectical form-matter motive.
Our discussion should disclose the fact, that the modern Humanistic ideals of science and personality did not play a role in the Greek distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy, but that the latter originated from the religious form-matter motive in its dialectical development within philosophic thought. As we saw, this distinction made its entry in Sophistic under the influence of the dialectical opposition of physis and nomos, as a dialectical antithesis of pure matter and cultural form (due to the paideia of the polis as the bearer of the cultural religion). It appeared that the further development of the distinction, and the question about the primacy of theoretical or practical philosophy, is closely connected with the dialectical antithesis between the realist-idealistic and the nominalist-naturalistic elaboration of the form-motive, conceived in conformity with the cultural religion. The nous is elevated to the rank of the form-principle of human nature.
This nous, as a pseudo-Archimedean point, is imprisoned in the modal diversity of meaning. Realist-idealistic attempts to surmount the modal diversity in a transcendental Idea of the Origin of all forms, theologically leads to an absolutizing of theoretical thought as divine nous, and the latter is then thought of as "pure form without matter". "Practical reason", because bound to the aim of conducting temporal human behaviour, is always related to the matter-principle of human nature. Therefore, it lacks the perfection of pure theoretical thought. The primacy of theoretical reason cannot be maintained unless this hypostatization of theoretical thought is made.
Naturalistic nominalism does not join in this metaphysical hypostatization of "pure thought" to "pure form" lifted out of the cosmic coherence of meaning. Yet, if it did not wish to abandon the Socratic trend toward the ethical form of the self-hood, nor to accept the Sophistic nihilism as to theoretical truth, it could only escape the extreme dualism between theoretical and practical reason by axiologically subordinating theoretical philosophy to practical ethics. But the basic antinomy between heoretical and practical reason in Stoic and Epicurean philosophy testifies to the fact that the two poles in the transcendental ground-Idea of Greek thought were no more reconciled in naturalistic nominalism than in idealistic realism.
Why we cannot divide philosophy into a theoretical and a practical.
Our conclusion is, that the basic division of philosophy into a theoretical and practical section, as well as the division between nature- and spirit-philosophy, are intrinsically connected with the immanence standpoint and its conception of the human selfood. This division points to an inner dissension in the Archimedean point, a discord, which necessarily leads to the ascription of primacy to theoretical or practical philosophy.
From the standpoint of re-formed Christian philosophy, in view of its transcendental ground-Idea, this distinction must be discarded in all of its many forms. Our rejection is not made because we will not have anything to do with immanence philosophy, but because the division in question is incompatible with the Biblical ground-motive of our philosophical thought.
We have seen, that the human selfhood as the religious root, as the heart of our entire existence, transcends the temporal limits of our cosmos. It transcends all the modal aspects. Philosophy, directed toward the totality of meaning, in the whole of its activity, is necessarily of a theoretical character. From a Christian point of view, therefore, it is meaningless and even dangerous to take over a basic classification, employed by immanence philosophy, which is rooted in the intrinsic dissension of its Archimedian point.
Upon a re-formed Christian standpoint "practical reason" cannot bridge over the fundamental diversity of the normative modal aspects of our cosmos. And neither a theoretical, nor a practical reason, in the sense of immanence philosophy, is identical with our veritable transcendent selfhood.
Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I/ Part III/ Chapt 2/§ 1 pp 528-541)
