"Two Humeans Preaching Causality to Nature" le Steven Campbell 1984
§5 - FÀS A' BHUN-ANTÌNOMI ANN AN "CRITÌG AN REUSAIN PHRATAIGICH".
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§5 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASIC ANTINOMY IN THE "CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON"
The kernel of the Humanistic ideal of personality in the typical form which it assumes in KANT's transcendental ground-Idea is the freedom and autonomy of the ethical function of personality in its hypostatization as "homo noumenon".
As we have formerly seen in another context, it is essentially the hypostatization of the merely formally conceived moral law itself which is identified with the "homo noumenon", as "pure will."
Autos and nomos in KANT's Idea of autonomy.
KRONER strikingly observes that "a double sense is included in the Idea of moral autonomy". The ego does not only subject itself to the moral law, instead of receiving as a slave the command of his master from outside, but it also acquires its own selfhood only through the very law. It does not become autos but on account of its subjecting itself to the nomos, it only becomes an ego when it obeys itself: "The (moral) law is consequently the true ego in the I-ness, it is the transcendental consciousness, the pure practical Reason, to whose rank the empirical will has to elevate itself, if it is to become an ethical one. Reason becomes only as law-giver the reason which separates itself from arbitrariness and inclination. The law which derives its legitimation from itself, and commands by its own authority, elevates Reason above all finite connections, and makes it infinite, absolute" (1).
Autos and nomos in KANT's Idea of autonomy.
KRONER strikingly observes that "a double sense is included in the Idea of moral autonomy". The ego does not only subject itself to the moral law, instead of receiving as a slave the command of his master from outside, but it also acquires its own selfhood only through the very law. It does not become autos but on account of its subjecting itself to the nomos, it only becomes an ego when it obeys itself: "The (moral) law is consequently the true ego in the I-ness, it is the transcendental consciousness, the pure practical Reason, to whose rank the empirical will has to elevate itself, if it is to become an ethical one. Reason becomes only as law-giver the reason which separates itself from arbitrariness and inclination. The law which derives its legitimation from itself, and commands by its own authority, elevates Reason above all finite connections, and makes it infinite, absolute" (1).
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(1) Von Kant bis Hegel, Bnd. I, p. 167: "Das Gesetz ist also das wahre Ich im Ich, es ist das transzendentale Bewusztzsein, die reine praktische Vernunft, zu der sich der empirische Wille zu erheben hat, wenn er ein sittlicher werden will. Die Vernunft wird als Gesetzgeberin erst zur Vernunft, die sich von Willkur und Neigung unterscheidet. Das Gesetz, das seinen Rechtsgrund aus sich schöpft, das eigener Vollmacht gebietet, erhebt die Vernunft über alle endlichen Zusammenhänge, macht sie unendlich, absolut."
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In KANT's theoretical philosophy self-consciousness had only a hovering existence in the "transcendental unity of apperception" which is related to the phenomenon. In the "Critique of Practical Reason", however, it discloses its "metaphysical root" (2).
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(2) Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (W.W., Bnd. V), Vorrede, p. 108:
"Hierbei erhält nun zugleich die befremdliche, obzwar unstreitige, Behauptung der spekulativen Kritik dasz sogar das denkende Subject ihm selbst in der inneren Anschauung blosz Erscheinung sei, in der Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft auch ihre volle Bestätigung, so gut, dasz man auf sie kommen musz, wenn die erstere diesen Satz auch gar nicht bewiesen hätte." [With this the critique of Practical Reason at the same time completely confirms the surprising, although undisputable, assertion of the speculative critique, that even the thinking subject in the inner intuition can conceive itself only as phenomenon; and this confirmation is so striking, that one must even arrive at this thesis if the latter (viz, the speculative critique) had not at all demonstrated it."]
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We have seen that in this very dualistic conception of the selfhood once more is disclosed the unsoluble antinomy in KANT's trascendental ground-Idea : In the "Critique of Pure Reason" the "thinking ego", conceived of as a pure transcendental-logical subject, is made the autonomous unity of self-consciousness, whereas in the "Critique of Practical Reason" the ethical and faith functions of human personality are hypostatized as metaphysical root of human existence. In this way the human ego is itself broken up into two diametrically opposed roots. This remains true even though KANT rejects the conception that the transcendental selfconsciousness is a "Ding an sich".
The dualistic division between the ideal of science and the ideal of personality delivers the latter into the hands of a logical formalism.
The hypostatization of the moral and faith functions of human personality necessarily results in a logical formalization of ethics and theology, which, as we saw, leads to a disturbance of meaning of the modal law-spheres concerned. Contrary to KANT's own intention, theoretical logic dominates the ideal of personality as formulated in the categorical imperative. The sharp dualistic "either-or" between sensibility and reason, induced him to apply — though not in a theoretical epistemological sense — even to the moral principles, the same form-matter schema which had played a dominating role in his epistemology: "If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, it can think the same only as such principles which contain the ground of determination of the will, not in respect to the matter, but merely in respect to the form" (3).
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(3) Kritik der pr. V., S. 136: "Wenn ein vernünftiges Wesen sich seine Maximen als praktische allgemeine Gesetze denken soll, so kann es sich dieselbe nur als solche Prinzipien denken, die nicht der Materie, sondern blosz der Form nach den Bestimmungsgrund des Willens enthalten."
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KANT's categorical imperative: "Behave so that the maxim of your will can at the same time hold as a principle of a universal legislation," is in essence a logicistic judgment, for the very reason that it is thought of as an "absolute" principle, separated from the cosmic-temporal coherence of meaning. By its elimination from the cosmic coherence among the modal law-spheres, it lacks any true inter-modal synthesis. In our treatment of the epistemological problem, we shall have ample opportunity to demonstrate this thesis more elaborately. In KANT the religious meaning of the Humanist ideal of personality concentrates itself essentially in the absolutizing of a function of human personality.
The transcendental concept of freedom considered in itself is merely negative (freedom from natural causality) and is to acquire a positive sense only through the principle of autonomy, in the sense of the absolute sovereignty of Human personality as the highest legislator. But this "autonomy", too, lacks as such a meaningful content. It is in itself only a formal principle. The religious ground-motive which finds its expression in KANT's transcendental freedom-Idea implies the self-sufficiency of the homo noumenon and it is this very divine predicate which makes any moral autonomy of man meaningless.
In KANT's conception, the ideal of personality actually requires the logistic hypostatization of the "categorical imperative"; however, it destroys itself by the very fact that it can only offer "stones for bread" when challenged to disclose its full religious content. Perhaps never in the history of philosophy has the Humanist ideal of personality received a more impressive formulation than in KANT's famous eulogy of duty, but, on the other hand, this ideal of personality has never before exhausted itself in an emptier formalism. To the impressive question, "Duty! sublime and great name... what is the origin worthy of yourself, and where is the noble root to be found that proudly excludes all kinship with the inclinations, and which is the indispensable origin from which man can derive any value that he can give himself ?" — the Königsberg philosopher replies: "It must be nothing less than that which elevates man (as a part of the sensory world) above himself, and connects him with an order of things only to be conceived by the understanding, an order embracing the whole world of the senses — including the empirically determinable existence of man in time — as well as the totality of all purposes... It is nothing but personality, i.e. the freedom and independence of the mechanism of the whole of nature. But at the same time it is to be considered as a faculty of a being to whose own peculiar — i.e. by its own reason imposed — and purely practical laws it is subjected insofar as it belongs to the sensory world. In other words the person, as belonging to the world of the senses, is subjected to his own personality insofar as he belongs to the intelligible world. It is not surprising, therefore, if man, who belongs to both worlds, looks upon his own being in relation to his second and highest destination with veneration and considers its laws with the greatest respect" (4).
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(4) Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, p. 211/2: "Pflicht! du erhabener, groszer Name... welcher ist der deiner würdige Ursprung, und wo findet man die Wurzel deiner edlen Abkunft, welche alle Verwandtschaft mit Neigungen stolz ausschlägst, und von welcher Wurzel abzustammen, die unnachläszliche Bedingung desjenigen Werts ist, den sich Menschen allein selbst geben können? Es kann nichts minderes sein, als was den Menschen über sich selbst (als einen Teil der Sinnenwelt) erhebt, was ihn an eine Ordnung der Dinge knüpft, die nur der Verstand denken kann, und die zugleich die ganze Sinnenwelt, mit ihr das empirische bestimmbare Dasein des Menschen in der Zeit und das Ganze alter Zwecke... unter sich hat. Es ist nichts anders als die Persönlichkeit, di. die Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit von dem Mechanism der ganzen Natur, doch zugleich als ein Vermögen eines Wesens betrachtet, welches eigentümlichen, nämlich von seiner eigenen Vernunft gegebenen, reinen praktischen Gesetzen, die Person also, als zur Sinnenwelt gehörig, ihrer eigenen Persönlichkeit unterworfen ist, so fern sie zugleich zur intelligibelen Welt gehört: da es denn nicht zu verwundern ist, wenn der Mensch als zu beiden Welten gehörig, sein eignes Wesen in Beziehung auf seine zweite und höchste Bestimmung nicht anders als mit Verehrung und die Gesetze derselben mit der höchsten Achtung betrachten musz."
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The precise definition of the principle of autonomy through the Idea of personality as "end in itself".
Free personality is viewed as an end in itself, as "absoluter Selbstzweck". To be sure, it is true enough that man is unholy, but "humanity" in his person ought to be sacred to him. In the entire cosmos all that man desires and all that over which he has power may be merely used as a means, only man and with him every rational creature is "Zweck an sich selbst."
This "human value", however, which must be sacred to everyone as homo noumenon, is itself in the last analysis the empty formula of the categorical imperative. The real motive of "pure practical reason" is also none other than the "pure", that is the absolutized and therefore formalized and empty moral law (5). Therein consists in KANT the fundamental difference between mere morality and legality.
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(5) Ibid., p. 213: "So ist die ächte Triebfeder der reinen praktischen Vernunft beschaffen; sie ist keine andere als das reine moralische Gesetz selber, so fern es uns die Erhabenheit unserer eigenen übersinnlichen Existenz spüren läszt..." ["Such is the nature of the true motive of the pure practical reason; it is but the pure moral law itself insofar as it makes us aware of the sublimity of our own super-sensual existence."]
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The thesis that human personality is an end in itself, can have a good meaning only in respect to the things which can become an object of human goals. That is to say it is meaningful only in the temporal subject-object relation in which things have modal object-functions in respect to the different modal functions of the volitive act of man.
As soon, however, as this thesis is extended to the central religious sphere, it becomes void, because it contradicts the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of human personality. The true religious root of our existence is nothing in itself, because it is only an imago Dei.
As soon as it is absolutized, it fades away in nothingness and cannot give any positive content to KANT's freedom-Idea. This very absolutization is implied in KANT's conception of the ethical idea of human personality as an absolute end in itself.
We have learned, in an earlier context, that the antinomy in the Humanist concept of substance consists in the fact that a result of theoretical abstraction is absolutized as a "thing in itself".
In KANT's practical philosophy, the absolute freedom of the "homo noumenon" exists by the grace of the same logical understanding that he had bound in his epistemology to the chain of sensory phenomena!
Now this understanding with its analytical laws even subjects the very ideal of personality to a logical formalization, whereas one would expect that, in keeping with the primacy of "practical reason", it should, on the contrary, be subject to the latter.
This is clearly evident from the noteworthy section of the "Analytic of Practical Reason", in which KANT treats the subject of the pure practical judgment (6).
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(6) Ibid., p. 188.
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At this point a problem rises with respect to the categorical imperative, which runs parallel to the problem KANT had raised in the so-called "Schematism-chapter" (7), with respect to the pure concepts of the understanding. Just as these pure concepts must be capable of being applied to sensory intuition, in the same manner that which in the ethical rule is said generally (in abstracto) must be applied, by the practical faculty of judgment, to an action in concreto.
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(7) I must postpone a detailed analysis of this important part of the Critique of Pure Reason until the second volume in which I will discuss the problems of epistemology.
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This gives rise to the difficulty that in KANT's system a concrete action is always "empirically determined", that is, belongs to the sensory experience of nature. And as KANT expressed it: It seems absurd, that one could encounter an instance in the sensory world, that, although itself subject to the laws of nature, yet is capable of being brought under a law of freedom. Naturally there can be no question of a schematization of the practical Idea of reason in the same manner as the schematization of the categories of the understanding, because the moral good ("the pure will") is something supra-sensory that never permits itself to be related to experience.
In the application of KANT's categorical imperative to concrete actions, the dualism between "nature" (ideal of science) and "freedom" (ideal of personality) becomes an antinomy.
The antinomy which necessarily must arise from the dualistic division of nature and freedom emerges at this point. The function of moral activity is impossible outside its cosmic temporal coherence of meaning with the "natural" functions. But the recognition of that connection of meaning would have immediately destroyed the hypostatization of the moral function in KANT's conception of the ideal of personality.
The way in which KANT sought to escape this contradiction is quite typical. The transcendental idea is only to be related to concepts of the understanding and not to sensory experience. Consequently, the moral law can only be schematized by relating it, in its abstract logical formulation, to the mere form of a natural law which is then qualified as a type of the moral law.
The natural law itself can be related to the "sense-objects" in concreto. It is evident that thereby the possibility of applying the categorical imperative to concrete actions is not demonstrated. Even though in KANT's system the category of causality can be related to sensory actions in concreto, this is only possible by means of its schematization in time.
But the mere form of natural law cannot be applied to sensory experience without its schematization in time as a form of intuition of the "inner sense" (8).
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(8) Ibid., p. 191: "Es ist also auch erlaubt, die Natur der Sinnenwelt Typus einer intelligibelen Natur zu brauchen, so lange ich nur nicht die Anschauungen, und was davon abhängig ist, auf diese übertrage, sondern blosz die Form der Gesetzmäszigkeit überhaupt (deren Begriff auch im gemeinsten Vernunftgebrauche stattfindet, aber in keiner anderen Absicht, als blosz zum reinen praktischen Gebrauche der Vernunft a priori bestimmt erkannt werden kann) darauf beziehe. Denn Gesetze als solche sind so fern einerlei, sie mögen ihre Bestimmungsgründe hernehmen, woher sie wollen." ["It is consequently also permitted to use the nature of the sense-world as a type of an intelligible nature, so long as I do not transfer to the latter the sensory intuitions and what is dependent on them, but relate to it only the form of conformity to law in general (the concept of which is also present in the most common use of reason, but to no other end than what can be understood as destined merely to the pure practical use of reason a priori). For laws as such are of the same kind, no matter from where they derive their determinative grounds."]
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According to KANT, the rule of the judicative faculty under laws of pure practical reason is this: ask yourself whether the action which you intend to perform could be viewed as possible through your will, if it would occur according to a law of nature, of which nature you yourself would be a part. Consequently, if the subjective maxim of action does not permit itself to be thought of according to the form of natural law, as a universal law of human action, it is morally impossible.
In the final analysis, this "Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft" is simply reduced to the judgment of the concrete actions according to the logical principium contradictionis. The mere form of the natural law is, according to KANT's own statement, nothing but the form of the "conformity to law in general"; for laws as such are of the same kind, no matter from where they derive their "determinative grounds".
To apply the categorical imperative, KANT has no other choice than to relate it to the logicistic generic concept of "law", which in fact is identified with the analytical principle of contradiction.
As the result of this logical formalism, the antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality acquires its greatest sharpness in KANT's transcendental ground-Idea. The "pure will" must be comprehended as "causa noumenon", i.e. as absolute metaphysical cause of human actions in their sensory mode of appearance. Under the "mechanism of nature" — the sovereign domain of the ideal of science — KANT subsumed psychical as well as physical causality, and mockingly he called psychological freedom "the freedom of a turnspit, which also, once it is wound up, executes its movements of its own accord" (9).
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(9) Kritik der pr. Vern., p. 224.
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KANT's characterization of LEIBNIZ' conception of free personality as "automaton spirituale."
The Leibnizian automaton spirituale, which through its representations is determined to its activity, is, according to him, just as devoid of real transcendental freedom as the automaton materiale that is nothing but a material machine. KANT remarks: "if indeed human actions, as they actually belong to the determinations of man in time, were not only determinations of man as phenomenon, but as 'thing in itself', then freedom could not be saved. Man would be a marionette or a Vauconson automaton, constructed by the highest Master of all art works, and even though self-consciousness would make him a thinking automaton, he would be of such a nature that the consciousness of his spontaneity, when considered as freedom, would be a mere deception..." (10).
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(10) Kritik der pr. Vern., p. 229.
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God has created man, however, only as a homo noumenon, not as "phenomenon". So it is a contradiction to say that God, as Creator, is the cause of actions in the sense-world, while he is at the same time the cause of the existence of the acting being as noumenon (11).
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(11) lb., p. 231. At this point one can clearly see how KANT's Idea of God is determined by the ideal of personality.
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But the "causa noumenon" of sensory actions itself appears to be nothing but the absolutized form of the law "überhaupt". This is the embodied antinomy itself.
The categorial imperative, as moral law, is itself thought of as subjective "causa noumenon". Why? Since the subjective moral volitional function (over against which the categorical imperative sets itself as a "norm", because the volitional function can exceed the law) cannot be comprehended as "free cause". For KANT views this subject-function as "empirically conditioned" and dependent upon sensory nature.
KRONER thinks he can solve this antinomy by stating, that not the "pure" (that is hypostatized) will, but only the "empirically conditioned pure will" is to be understood as "causa noumenon" of actions. However, unintentionally he gives in this way the most pregnant formulation to this Kantian antinomy (12).
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(12) KRONER, Op. cit. I, S. 199.
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For how can a "pure will" be "empirically conditioned" without losing its "purity", i.e. its absolute character? Speculative idealism with its dialectical method sanctions the antinomy as a transitional stage to a higher synthesis. KANT, however, did not accept antinomies and so this solution can never constitute an answer within his system.
KRONER'S conception of the origin of the antinomy in KANT's doctrine of "pure will" as "causa noumenon".
KRONER has, however, penetratingly seen wherein lies the origin of the antinomy in KANT's doctrine of "pure will" as "causa noumenon". This origin is hidden in the impossibility of thinking the moral-logical form of reason together with its sensorily determined material.
As we saw before, the "Typik der reinen praktischen Vernunft" does not afford any escape from this difficulty. In KANT's system the "Dialectic of pure reason" could only demonstrate that the natural scientific category of causality is exclusively related to sensory experience but never to "Dinge an sich". The "Critique of pure Reason", however, could not furnish us with the insight into the possibility of a real connection between nature and supra-sensory freedom, since it was itself based upon the hypostatization of the logical and psychical functions of consciousness. KANT thought he could lift these functions out of the cosmic temporal coherence of meaning without this hypostatization. But this is impossible.
The antinomy between nature and freedom in KANT's concept of the highest good.
In a final attempt KANT tried to re-establish in practical reason the coherence of meaning between nature and freedom, which he had crudely severed. To this end he used the concept of the highest good. Nevertheless, it has generally been acknowledged that it is just this very point in KANT's system which exhibits its weakest spot and actually resolves itself into intrinsic antinomies.
It is our intention to examine briefly this final attempt to achieve a synthesis. KANT considers the older heteronomous (non-realistic) ethics to be characterized by the fact that it sought after an "object of the will" in order to make this at the same time both the material and the ground of the moral law. This was done instead of first seeking after a law, which apriori and directly determines the will and the object of the latter only through the will itself.
Thus in this heteronomous ethics the concept of the highest good became the final determinative ground of the moral will (13). To KANT the concept of the "highest good" becomes the "unconditional totality of the object of pure practical reason", but it is never to be comprehended as the determinative ground of the "pure will" (14). The moral law as the final determinative ground is rather pre-supposed in this concept.
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(13) Ibid., p. 183/4.
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(14) Ibid., p. 283/9.
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In the concept of the highest good, however, virtue (as the determination of the will exclusively by the categorical imperative) and blessedness (as the motive of our sensibility) must, according to KANT, be conceived of as necessarily united. For it cannot be supposed that personality needs blessedness and is worthy of it, but nevertheless cannot possess it; this would be incompatible with the perfect will of the rational Being that at the same time is almighty (i.e. the deity). This uniting of virtue and beatitude cannot be conceived of analytically, since freedom and nature do not logically follow from each other, but rather exclude each other (15).
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(15) Kr. d. pr. V., S. 243: "Also bleibt die Frage: "wie ist das höchste Gut praktisch möglich? noch immer unerachtet aller bisherigen Koalitionsversuche eine unaufgelösete Aufgabe. Das aber, was sie zu einer schwer zu lösenden Aufgabe macht, ist in der Analytik gegeben, nämlich dasz Glückseligkeit und Sittlichkeit, zwei spezifisch ganz verschiedene Elemente des höchsten Guts sind, und ihre Verbindung also nicht analytisch erkannt werden könne... sondern eine Synthesis der Begriffe sei." [Thus, notwithstanding all attempts at a solution, the question: "How is the highest good practically possible?" still remains an unsolved problem. That, however, which makes the latter a problem hardly to be solved, is given in the Analytic, namely that blessedness and morality are two specifically completely different elements of the highest good, so that their uniting cannot be understood analytically... but rather is a synthesis of concepts"].
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It can only be thought of synthetically, and then only in such a manner, that either happiness is the necessary result of virtue as "causa noumenon", or vice versa the desire for happiness is the moving cause of moral action. The latter alternative is excluded by the principle of autonomy. But the first way seems equally impossible, since all practical uniting of causes and effects in the world as a result of the determination of the will is not directed by the moral inclination of the will, but rather by the knowledge of natural laws and the physical power to employ these to its purposes.
KANT formulates the antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality as it is implied in the concept of the highest good as the "antinomy of practical reason".
Thus arises the "antinomy of practical reason" which KANT treats in the chapter entitled "About the dialectic of pure Reason in the defining of the concept of the highest good". He thought, however, the following solution would afford a satisfactory answer to the difficulty. He conceded that the judgment according to which the desire for happiness is the moving cause of moral action, must be unconditionally qualified as false. The second proposition, that happiness is the necessary result of virtue, however, is only false insofar as virtue is considered to be the cause of happiness in the sense world, so that only a phenomenal existence would be ascribed to rational beings. It is, however, not only quite reasonable to think of the existence of man as noumenon in an intelligible world, but there is even given in the moral law a pure intelligible determinative ground of the causality of free personality in the sense-world. Therefore, according to KANT, it is not impossible that by an intelligible Creator of nature, the moral inclination is set in a necessary causal coherence with beatitude as its effect in the sense-world.
Thus KANT finally felt compelled to accept a coherence between "nature" and "freedom" in order to escape the antinomical consequences of his hypostatization (and consequently logicistic formalization) of moral personality. The acceptance of such an intelligible Creator of nature (the Deity) cannot be rationally proved, but it is a postulate of pure practical reason that makes possible the realization of the highest good. This postulate consequently does not rest upon a theoretical knowledge, but just as the two other postulates of pure practical reason (freedom in a positive sense and immortality), it rests upon a universally valid and necessary reasonable faith in the reality of a supra-sensory, noumenal world and in the possibility of the realization of the highest good.
It is easily seen that this entire attempt to bring "nature" and "freedom" again in a deeper coherence, can only be accomplished by abandoning the Idea of the "homo noumenon" as "Ding an sich". If the free and autonomous moral function of personality is actually to be the "substance" of human being (existence), a substance, which according to DESCARTES' pregnant description "nulla rē, indiget ad existendum", then there is no possible bridge between "nature" and "freedom". Every attempt to effect a synthesis must necessarily dissolve the basic absolutization in KANT's Humanistic ideal of personality. KRONER correctly observes, that the very characteristic of pure practical reason, i.e. its autonomy, is undermined by the inclusion of happiness as material determination ("Inhaltsbestimmung") in the pure moral law. By so doing the very absolute sovereignty of the moral will is restricted to sensibility instead of maintaining its absolute independence in the face of the latter (16).
It is the concept of the highest good itself into which all of the antinomies between the ideal of personality and that of science are crowded together!
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(16) KRONER, Op. cit. I, p. 209.
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In KANT's Idea of God the ideal of personality dominates the ideal of science.
KANT's Idea of deity as postulate of "pure practical reason" is the final hypostatization of the ideal of personality. In this hypostatization, the Idea of the noumenal world as "a nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason" (17), reaches its climax. This reasonable God is the categorical imperative itself, conceived of as the noumenal determinative ground of sensible nature. His will does not exceed "practical reason" with its hypostatized moral law. For the "principle of morality is not merely restricted to men, but extends to all finite beings which have reason and will, nay it even includes the infinite Being as Supreme Intelligence" (18).
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(17) Kr. d. pr. V., t.a.p., p. 158.
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(18) T.a.p., p. 143.
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The autonomous will can only recognize a command as divine insofar as it originates from "practical reason".
The philosophy of "religion" which KANT built upon his metaphysics of "reasonable faith" is the "Religion within the boundaries of mere Reason". In the writing published under the same title KANT attempts to accommodate Christian faith to his metaphysics rooted in his Humanist ideal of personality. In so doing he gave a striking example of the fundamental lack of insight into the essence and starting-point of the Christian doctrine, a lack of insight, which has from the outset characterized Humanistic philosophy. The faith of pure reason is, according to him, the kernel of all religious dogmas. Mankind is not capable of conceiving this kernel in its "purity"; it must be rendered perceptible, so that it can become a living force, a "religious reality".
If this "pure ethical kernel" is selected from the Christian revelation it is wonderfully in accord with the "apriori reasonable faith". The fall into sin is then nothing but the antagonism between sensory and moral nature, between "nature" and "freedom" in man.
The "radical evil" in human nature is its tendency to subject the will to sensory inclinations, instead of directing it by the "categorical imperative". Regeneration is a free deed of our moral nature through which the good conquers the evil.
The "God-man" is the Idea of the "moral ideal man" in whom reasonable faith accepts the absolute realization of the Idea of the good; in this sense the God-man is the pre-requisite for regeneration, for the latter can only take effect insofar as we believe in the possible realization of the moral Idea.
Consequently, insofar as the God-man is the redemptive force through whom regeneration is effectuated in this moral ideal of humanity and in the striving toward its realization, individual sins are atoned!
This is the religion of the Humanistic ideal of personality clad in the stiff garb of moralistic rationalism. And this is the "pure ethical kernel" which KANT thought he could select from the Christian revelation!
(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I/ Part 2/ Chapt 4/§5 pp 372-385)
