"Der Egoißt" deilbhte le Gunter Rambow (1968)
§ 3 - AN TEANNAS EADAR IDÈALAN AN T-SAIDHEINS AGUS NA PEARSANTACHD SA "PRAKTISCHE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE" LE FICHTE (1794).
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§ 3 - THE TENSION BETWEEN THE IDEALS OF SCIENCE AND PERSONALITY IN FICHTE'S "PRAKTISCHE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE" (1794).
The guiding thesis of the theoretical "doctrine of science" was the following: "The ego posits itself as determined by the non-ego." This thesis was contained in the result of the three basic theses of the entire "Wissenschaftslehre": "The ego and the non-ego determine each other reciprocally." In this latter thesis is expressed the necessary interaction between the antithetic elements in the activity of the self-consciousness, i.e. the interaction between the (free) subject and the (natural) object.
In this thesis, however, there is also implied the "guiding principle" of the practical "doctrine of science": "The ego posits itself as determining the non-ego." The latter is meaningful only after the demonstration in the theoretical doctrine of science that the ego actually produces the non-ego as real, so that the non-ego actually possesses reality for and in the ego (1).
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(1) FICHTE observes (I, 247) significantly: "es versteht sich, für das Ich, — wie denn die ganze Wissenschaftslehre, als transcendentale Wissenschaft, nicht über das Ich hinausgehen kann, noch soll..." ["naturally for the ego, — in as much as the entire doctrine of science, as transcendental science, neither can go beyond the ego, nor ought to do so..."]
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Only in the practical part is the ethical-idealistic basis even of the theoretical doctrine of science fully clarified.
FICHTE observes forthwith, on the occasion of the "Leitsatz" ("guiding thesis") of the practical doctrine of science: "For this thesis implies a main antithesis, which contains the entire contradiction between these entities as being simply posited and consequently unlimited, and compels us to assume a practical faculty of the ego for the sake of uniting them" (2).
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(2) I, 247: "Es liegt (nehmlich) in diesem Satze eine Haupt-Antithese, die den ganzen Widerstreit zwischen ebendenselben, als schlechthin gesetzten, mithin unbeschränkten Wesen umfasst, und uns nöthiget, als Vereinigungsmittel ein praktisches Vermögen des Ich anzunehmen."
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Only in the "practical" part, is an account eventually given of the reduction of the "theoretical" to the "practical" reason, and implicitly of the ideal of science to that of personality. The essence of the theoretical reason consisted in nothing but the restless dialectical movement, in which it sets limits to itself (in the "antitheses") in order to overpass them again and again by a new synthesis. It appeared dependent on "sensation" as the first groundless (and therefore theoretically incomprehensible) limit, that the ego sets to itself. The theoretical ego discovered the antinomy between the unlimited and the limited activity as the ground of its entire dialectical movement of thought, without being able to understand this ground. The first impulse for the development of the entire dialectical series, i.e. the sensory impression (Empfindung), alone makes "theoretical" reason possible, and so is not to be derived from it.
FICHTE refers the impulse toward sensory experience to the moral function of personality, in which the ideal of personality is concentrated.
The ground of this impulse can be sought only in the fact that the ego is "practical", so far as its innermost nature is concerned, and that the true root not only of personality but even of "nature" must be sought in the moral function (3).
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(3) FICHTE gives to this insight pregnant expression in his "Grundlage des Naturrechts": "Das praktische Vermögen ist die innerste Wurzel des Ich, auf diese wird erst alles andere aufgetragen und daran geheftet," III, 20 ff. ["The practical faculty is the innermost root of the ego; on it alone all the rest is built and affixed."]
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In the "Leitsatz" of the practical doctrine of science is implied the requirement that the ego operate causally upon the non-ego. Thereby the antinomy between the independence of the ego as an absolute being on the one hand, and its dependence and limitation as intelligence on the other, should be overcome. In this very demand, however, an antinomy is implied. The demand that the free ego operate causally upon the non-ego is based upon the absolute essence of the ego, allowing nothing alongside of or opposed to itself. The objection against this postulated causality is grounded on the fact that a non-ego is simply opposed to the ego, and that it must remain so, if the I-ness is not to become an empty form. The antinomy which is contained in the practical "Leitsatz" may be reduced to the antinomy between the ego as unlimited and infinite and the ego as limited and finite activity. Consequently, at this point, a higher discrepancy is involved in the very nature of the ego. How is this antinomy solved by FICHTE?
The infinite and unlimited ego as moral striving. Elimination also of KANT's practical concept of substance. The ego as infinite creative activity is identified with KANT's categorical imperative.
The antinomy is resolved in that the infinite and unlimited character of the ego is viewed not as an infinite substance at rest, but rather as an infinite striving. The free unlimited and infinite ego ought again and again to set limits to itself as "intelligence" by an objective non-ego, in order to provide its infinite striving activity with a resistance to be overcome ever and anon, which alone gives content to this striving.
"Just as the ego is posited, all reality is posited; in the ego everything is to be posited; the ego is to be simply independent; everything, however, is to be dependent upon it. Consequently, there is required accordance of the object with the ego; and it is the absolute ego which for the very sake of its absolute being, does require it" (4).
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(4) I, 260: "So wie das Ich gesetzt ist, ist alle Realität gesetzt; im Ich soll alles gesetzt seyn; das Ich soll schlechthin unabhängig, Alles aber soll von ihm abhängig seyn. Also, es wird die Uebereinstimmung des Objects mit dem Ich gefordert; und das absolute Ich, gerade um seines absolutes Seyns willen, ist es, welches sie fordert."
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In the striving resides the final ground of the opposing and of that which is set in opposition, the final ground of the "impulse", which the theoretical W.L. [Wissenschaftslehre] was unable to explain. Therefore, the practical reason is at the basis of the theoretical as its condition, for without striving no object is possible (5).
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(5) I, 264.
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In a note to the passage just cited, FICHTE observes: "KANT's categorical imperative." Thus it clearly appears that FICHTE really seeks the deepest root of the self-consciousness in the hypostatized moral law, identified with the ideal subject in the rationalist conception of the cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic thought (6).
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(6) WINDELBAND rightly observes, op. cit. II, 224: "Das Sittengesetz also, d.h. die Forderung eines Handelns, das lediglich sich selbst zum Zwecke hat ist der die Welt erzeugende Trieb des absolutes Ich." ["Consequently, it is the moral law, i.e. the demand of an acting which has only itself as its aim, that is the impulse of the absolute ego whereby the world is generated."]
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At the same time it appears from the sequel that the Divinity, as the absolute ego, is nothing but the result of this moralistic hypostatization. The striving activity of the ego, going on to infinity, is as striving characterized again as finite: "Even the very concept of striving, however, implies finiteness, for that which is not counter-acted (striven against), is no striving" (7).
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(7) V, 270: "Im Begriffe des Strebens selbst aber liegt schon die Endlichkeit, denn dasjenige, dem nicht widerstrebt wird, ist kein Streben."
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The finite (moral, "practical") ego, however, can have no other goal for its infinite striving than again to become absolute.
The tension between ego and non-ego, between form and matter, consciousness and being, freedom and nature, the ideal of personality and the ideal of science, should be eliminated in the absolute ego (the Divinity), which is just so far an unthinkable Idea (unthinkable, because reason is unable to emerge beyond the antinomy). Actually, however, the absolute ego is nothing but a hypostatized, activistically conceived moral Idea of reason, which as such remains involved in the antinomy between the ideal of science and the ideal of personality; for, on the one hand, it must contain the origin as well as the totality of meaning, but, on the other hand, it is nothing but an absolutized abstraction from the cosmic temporal coherence of meaning (8).
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(8) FICHTE has given to his conception of the Deity as absolutized moral law a pregnant expression in his treatise Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung (WW. V, 185), where he writes: "Dies ist der wahre Glaube; diese moralische Ordnung ist das Göttliche das wir annehmen"; ["this is the true faith; this moral order is the Deity which we accept;"] and in his Appellation an das Publikum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus (1799; WW. V, 210), where he writes: "Erzeuge nur in dir die pflichtmäszige Gesinnung und du wirst Gott erkennen." ["Produce only in yourself the inclination in conformity to moral duty and you will know God."] The moral order, as Deity, is to FICHTE pervaded with the activity-motive of his philosophy of the ego. It is: "Thätiges Ordnen" (active ordaining), ORDO ORDINANS. Cf. WW. V, 382, Aus einem Privatschreiben.
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From the Humanist standpoint, KRONER correctly observes: "Even the absolute ego needs necessarily the 'impulse' if in any sense it is to be an ego" (9). In other words, even in the "absolute ego" as a hypostatized function there is latent the basic antinomy between "nature" and "freedom".
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(9) KRONER, I, 511: "Der 'Anstosz' ist auch dem absolutem Ich, damif es nur überhaupt ein Ich sein könne, notwendig."
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In the practical doctrine of science [Wissenschaftslehre], the ego is conceived of as absolute striving. With the striving there is connected a counter-striving, and the theoretical ego is now viewed by FICHTE as necessarily coherent with the practical. For, by reason of the counter-action (i.e. of "nature" as the non-ego), the ego is determined by something outside itself. Because it is an ego, it must reflect about this being-limited, it must relate itself to the "Gegenstand", as to its opposite. In the theoretical doctrine of science [Wissenschaftslehre], in the deduction of the representation, the ego (conceiving itself as limited by the non-ego) is deduced genetically by ascending from the sensory consciousness (limited by the non-ego) to the free transcendental consciousness. Likewise, in the second constructive part of the practical W. L., beginning with par. 6, the origin of the practical ego, which conceives itself as free and determines the non-ego, is deduced from the ego that is determined merely by the "impulse". There is a strict correspondence between these two ways of deduction.
Besides, it appears in the nature of the case that the theoretical and the practical ego are one and the same (for we saw previously that FICHTE tries to reduce the ideal of science to the ideal of personality and to absorb the former in the latter!). "All reflection is based upon striving, and there is no reflection possible, if there is no striving" (10).
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(10) "Alle Reflexion gründet sich auf das Streben, und es ist keine möglich, wenn kein Streben ist."
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Striving is the final common root of the theoretical and the practical ego: all theoretical reflection, all sensation, all intuition stems from the practical striving, from the activity of the moral ego-function, which transcends its boundaries. In this context we will quote a passage which is very characteristic for the whole system, because it gives a clear expression to the eventual absorption of the ideal of science in the ideal of personality. We insert it here entirely on that account: "From this follows, indeed, in the clearest manner the subordination of theory to the practical; it follows that all theoretical laws are based upon practical ones and, as there can be only one single practical law, upon one and the same law; consequently the most complete system in the total (human) being; if the impulse should permit itself to be elevated, then also follows the elevation of the insight, and vice versa; then follows the absolute freedom of reflection and abstraction also in a theoretical respect, and the possibility of focusing one's attention to something according to moral duty and of abstracting it from something else, without which no morality would be possible at all."
"Fatalism is destroyed at its very root, this fatalism based on the opinion that our acting and willing depend upon the system of our representations; for it is shown here, that the very system of our representations depends upon our impulse and our will; and this is indeed the single way to refute this view thoroughly. — In short, by this system there is brought unity and coherence into the whole man, a unity and coherence which are lacking in so many systems" (11).
The totality of meaning of the consciousness, the very root of human existence, and consequently of the entire cosmos, resides in the absolutized moral function. It is that which must bring unity and coherence in the whole man.
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(11) I, 294/5: "Hieraus erfolgt denn auch auf das einleuchtendste die Subordination der Theorie unter das Praktische; es folgt, dass alle theoretischen Gesetze auf praktische und da es wohl nur Ein praktisches Gesetz geben dürfte, auf ein und ebendasselbe Gesetz sich gründen; demnach das vollständigste System im ganzen Wesen; es folgt, wenn etwa der Trieb sich selbst sollte erhöhen lassen, auch die Erhöhung der Einsicht, und umgekehrt; es erfolgt die absolute Freiheit der Reflexion und Abstraktion auch in theoretischer Rücksicht, und die Möglichkeit pflichtmäszig seine Aufmerksamkeit auf etwas zu richten, und von etwas anderem abzuziehen ohne welche gar keine Moral möglich ist.
"Der Fatalismus wird von Grund aus zerstört, der sich darauf gründet, das unser Handeln und Wollen von dem Systeme unserer Vorstellungen abhängig sey (the italics are mine!), indem hier gezeigt wird, das hinwiederum das System unserer Vorstellungen von unserem Triebe und unserem Willen abhängt: und dies ist denn auch die einzige Art ihn gründlich zu wiederlegen. — Kurz, es kommt durch dieses System Einheit und Zusammenhang in den ganzen Menschen, die in so vielen System fehlt."
Vid. also I, 284, note: "Die Wissenschaftslehre soll den ganzen Menschen erschöpfen; sie läszt daher sich nur mit der Totalität seines ganzen Vermögens auffassen..." ["The doctrine of science ought to exhaust the whole man; it is consequently to be conceived only with the totality of all human faculties..."]
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The "fatalism" so keenly opposed by FICHTE is nothing but the science-ideal of the "Aufklärung", dominating the ideal of personality.
The "fatalism" so sharply opposed by FICHTE is nothing but the Humanistic science-ideal of the "Enlightenment", which had no place for the freedom of human personality, because it was made independent of the latter.
In the polar tension between this ideal of science and the ideal of personality, FICHTE chooses unconditionally for the absolute primacy of the latter — at the expense of the former, as we are still to see!
In his practical doctrine of science, FICHTE consequently does not stay with the Kantian dualism between moral self-determination and sensory "inclination of nature". Just as the "sensory ego", qua ego, is driven forward dialectically by itself to become the ego that knows itself as intelligence, so also the ego dominated by its sensual impulses becomes the ego determining itself as "pure ethical will".
So FICHTE intends to show that even in the "triebhafte Ich", the "pure will" or the "absolute impulse" is operative, and that only thereby does the ego feel itself "driven on and ahead" by natural impulses. The sensory nature must finally take its rise dialectically from moral freedom itself. In the ego there is an original striving to "fill out" infinity. This striving conflicts with all limitation in an object. A self-producing striving is called impulse ("Trieb").
Infinite striving requires on the other hand the resistance, the counter-action from an object, in order to overcome this latter. The ego has in itself the law, according to which it must reflect about itself "as filling out infinity". But it cannot reflect about itself, if it is not limited. The fulfilling of this law, or — what amounts to the same thing — the satisfaction of the "Reflexionstrieb" (impulse to reflection), is thus determined by the non-ego, and depends on the object (the non-ego). This impulse toward reflection cannot be satisfied apart from an object: hence it may also be described as an "impulse toward the object" (12). The striving therefore requires a counter-action that holds it in balance.
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(12) I, 291.
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In the limitation, which the "impulse" experiences through the object, the feeling arises as the expression of a suffering, a passivity, an inability: "The expression of impotence in the ego is called a feeling. In it is united most intimately an activity — I feel, I am the feeling subject; and this activity is that of reflection — and a limitation — I feel, I am passive and not active; there is present a constraint. This limitation necessarily supposes an impulse to go beyond it. That which wills, needs, embraces nothing more, is — naturally with respect to itself — unlimited" (13).
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(13) I, 289: "Die Äußerung des Nicht-könnens im Ich heiszt ein Gefühl. In ihm ist innigst vereinigt Thätigkeit — ich fühle, bin das fühlende, und diese Thätigkeit ist die der Reflexion — Beschränkung — ich fühle, bin leidend, und nicht thätig: es ist ein Zwang vorhanden. Diese Beschränkung setzt nun notwendig einen Trieb voraus, weiter hinaus zu gehen. Was nichts weiter will, bedarf, umfasst, das ist — es versteht sich, für sich selbst — nicht eingeschränkt."
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In its limitation by feeling, the "Reflexionstrieb" is at the same time satisfied and not satisfied:
a - It is satisfied: the ego must reflect on itself: it reflects with absolute spontaneity and is thereby satisfied with respect to the form of this operation of consciousness. So far the feeling can be related to the free ego.
b - It is not satisfied with respect to the content of this operation of consciousness. "The ego was to be posited as filling out infinity, but it is posited as limited. This, too, is now necessarily present in feeling" (14).
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(14) "Das Ich sollte gesetzt werden als die Unendlichkeit ausfüllend, aber es wird als begrenzt. — Dies kommt nun gleichfalls nothwendig vor im Gefühle."
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c - The originating of the condition of non-satisfaction, however, is determined by the ego proceeding beyond the limit which is set by feeling (15).
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(15) I, 291/2.
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The dialectical line of thought of the practical doctrine of science [Wissenschaftslehre]: feeling, intuition, longing, approbation, absolute impulse (categorical imperative).
The course of FICHTE's deductions is therefore as follows: the ego, as a limited and finite ego, is moral striving according to its deepest being. To be able to create itself as such, and to become aware of itself as such, it is, however, required, that it should be and feel itself as a sensibly driven feeling and intuiting ego. But conversely, it would never feel itself as sensibly limited, if it were not moral striving according to its deepest being.
In consequence of the appropriation by the striving ego of the feeling of compulsion, which arises from the counter-action of the non-ego, i.e. in consequence of the conscious reflection about it as the ego's own limit, there arises a new feeling, in which the feeling ego feels itself in the impulse which strives out beyond the limit.
So far as the drive which is formally satisfied in the reflection about the feeling ego, strives out beyond the limit set in reflection, as a force that strives outward, it becomes longing, ("Sehnen"), "a drive toward something completely unknown, which merely manifests itself by a want, by an uneasiness, by a void, which seeks to be filled out, and does not indicate from where." FICHTE here makes this note: "This longing is important, not only for the practical, but for the whole doctrine of science [Wissenschaftslehre]. Only by the same the ego is in itself driven beyond itself: only by the same does an outerworld disclose itself in the very ego" (16).
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(16) I, 303: "einen Trieb nach etwas völlig unbekannten, das sich bloss durch ein Bedürfniss, durch ein Misbehagen, durch eine Leere offenbart, die Ausfülling sucht, und nicht andeutet woher." "Dieses Sehnen ist wichtig, nicht nur für die praktische, sondern für die gesammte Wissenschaftslehre. Lediglich durch dasselbe wird das Ich in sich selbst — ausser sich getrieben: lediglich durch dasselbe offenbart sich in ihm selbst eine Aussenwelt."
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This longing, however, is also limited, for otherwise it would be no desire, but fulfilment of desire: causality. Through this limitation by the non-ego there arises a new feeling of compulsion, which again becomes the ground for the creation of an object, the production of something outside the ego through "ideal activity", the "ideal" for which the ego longs in its striving.
The object of the feeling of compulsion produced by the limitation is something real. The object of the longing, however, has no reality (since the ego in itself can have no causality, without cancelling itself as "pure activity"), "but it ought to have it in consequence of the longing; for the latter seeks reality" (17). Both objects stand in an antinomic relation to one another ("nature" and "freedom"!).
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(17) I, 306: "aber es soll sie zufolge des Sehnens haben; denn dasselbe geht aus auf Realität."
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The reality felt determines (limits) the ego. The ego, however, is ego only insofar as it determines itself (in the reflection about the feeling). Therefore its longing becomes the impulse to determine itself. Or indeed, since it feels its determination (limitation) in the reality of the object, its longing becomes the impulse to determine this reality for the object and thus to create the determination in itself.
In the "longing" arises the impulse to sensory perception ("Empfindungstrieb") and the "drive toward knowledge" in general, which strives to regain for the ego the natural object created by it, but not created with reflection on this act (and therefore not experienced as the ego's own); it strives to represent the object in the I-ness. The limit is felt as felt, i.e. as one created in the ego by the ego. The sensory feeling ("Empfinden") is changed (as the theoretical W. L. has shown) by a new reflection into an intuition. So far as the ego has not yet, in the self reflection of thought, theoretically appropriated that which is sensibly perceived, it does not yet regard the sensory image as a product of the ego, but the image is intuited as an "objective character". Since the free spontaneity of the ego in the activity of intuition is the driving force, the image is, to be sure, intuited as a character belonging to the object, but contingent, determined by no necessity (18). [De gevoelde realiteit bepaalt (begrenst) het ik. Het ik is echter slechts ik, voorzoover het zich zelve bepaalt (in de reflexie over het gevoel). Daarom wordt zijn verlangen tot de aandrift zich zelve te bepalen, of wel, daar het zijn bepaaldheid (begrensdheid) in de realiteit van het object gevoelt, deze realiteit voor het object te bepalen en zoo zelve de bepaaldheid in zich te scheppen. In het ‘verlangen’ ontspringt de ‘Empfindungstrieb’ en de ‘kennisdrift’ in het algemeen, die ernaar streeft het door het ik geschapen, maar niet met reflexie over deze handeling geschapen (en daarom niet aan het ik eigen ervaren) (natuur-) object voor het ik weer terug te winnen, het in het ik af te beelden. De grens wordt gevoeld als gevoeld, d.i. als een in het ik door het ik geschapene. Het zinnelijk gevoel (‘Empfinden’) verandert zich zoo (gelijk de theoretische W.L. getoond heeft) door nieuwe reflexie in een aanschouwen. Het zinnelijk beeld, wordt door het ik, voorzoover dit laatste zich het zinnelijk waargenomene nog niet in zelf-reflexie van het denken eigen heeft gemaakt, nog niet als product van het ik gevat, maar het beeld wordt aanschouwd als ‘objectieve geaardheid’, en wel, daar de vrije spontaniteit van het ik in de aanschouwingsactiviteit het aandrijvende is, als een, aan het object toekomende, maar toevallige, door geen noodwendigheid bepaalde geaardheid.(18)(WdW Boek I p 411)]
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(18) I, 317: "Würde das Ich seiner Freiheit im Bilden (dadurch, dass es auf die gegenwärtige Reflexion selbst wieder reflektirte) sich bewuszt, so würde das Bild gesetzt, als zufällig in Beziehung auf das Ich. Eine solche Reflexion findet nicht statt; es muss demnach zufällig gesetzt werden (in Beziehung auf ein anderes nicht-Ich, das uns bis jetzt noch gänzlich unbekannt ist)." ["If the ego should become aware of its freedom in its production (thereby, that it reflects again on the present reflection itself), the image would be set as contingent in relation to the I. Such a reflection does not occur; it is consequently to be set contingently (in relation to another non-ego, which up till now is still entirely unknown to us)."]
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If, however, the object is to become an object for the ego, then the ego must become aware of this self-determination of the object as a product of the ego itself. The feeling ego feels itself limited, the intuiting ego freely exceeds the limit. The feeling and the intuiting ego are, however, one and the same: feeling and intuition must therefore be synthetically united. In themselves they have no coherence. "Intuition sees, but it is empty: feeling is related to reality, but is blind" (19).
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(19) I, 319.
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They can be united only when the feeling ego no longer feels itself as such to be limited, when, so to speak, it keeps pace with the intuition, which views what is felt as something contingent in the object. This is only possible in such a way that the feeling ego as such exceeds its limits, and that it, as feeling ego, goes on ad infinitum, or that it is driven on in its longing, instead of losing itself in sensuous feeling.
So the longing discloses itself, as an "impulse toward change of feelings": only where the feelings change, is the primitive longing satisfied.
Feeling as such, however, cannot determine the change of feelings. The ego can reflect about what is felt only at a higher stage of consciousness. "Consequently, the changed situation cannot be felt as changed situation. This other should therefore merely be intuited by the ideal activity, as something other and opposed to the present feeling" (20). The changed feeling must therefore be intuited as changed, if the ego is to be able to reflect about the impulse to change its feelings.
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(20) I, 321: "Also der veränderte Zustand kann als veränderte Zustand nicht gefühlt werden. Das andere müsste daher lediglich durch die ideale Thätigkeit angeschaut werden, als etwas anderes und dem gegenwärtigen Gefühle entgegengesetztes."
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Only through this reflection does the ego become an ego, because it is an ego only insofar as it not merely longs, but insofar as it becomes aware that it longs to change the feelings. If the ego is to be able to arrive at this consciousness, then it must be able as feeling ego to relate itself to a feeling which is not itself that which is felt. And to this end intuition and feeling must be synthetically united in this feeling. This is the feeling of longing, which is necessarily accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction. The altered feeling must satisfy the longing after a change of the feeling. The synthesis here achieved FICHTE calls "approbation" ("Beifall").
The ego reflects about its feeling in the intuition of it. The act of determining the feeling (the intuiting) and the drive toward determination (the longing) are now one and the same (21).
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(21) I, 325.
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The ego cannot produce this synthesis of impulse (longing) and action (intuiting) without distinguishing the two, but it cannot distinguish the two without positing some respect in which they contradict each other: So the feeling of approbation finds its opposite in the displeasure ("Misfallen"), in which the disharmony between impulse and act comes to expression. "Not every longing is necessarily accompanied by displeasure, but when it is satisfied, there arises displeasure as to the former; it becomes insipid, flat." So are "the inner determinations of the things (which are related to feeling) nothing more than degrees of displeasing or pleasing" (22).
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(22) ibidem.
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The synthesis in the approbation, however, may not be performed merely by the spectator, i.e. only theoretically, but the ego itself must perform it. The ego must be driven on to desire approval as such; it must also be aware of the impulse which strives toward approval, and therewith towards the unity of its selfhood.
If the ego is to become aware of the synthesis between intuition and feeling in approbation, then the intuition and the impulse alike must be understood as determined and self-determining at the same time. Then alone is the ego aware of itself as an ego that determines itself absolutely and consequently is also absolutely determined.
If the action that satisfies the impulse is determined and self-determining at once, then it happens out of absolute freedom, as the self-creation of the absolute ego. If the impulse which determines this action is absolute in the same way, then it is grounded in itself. It is the impulse that has itself for its goal. The drive towards change ("Trieb nach Wechsel") is in the last analysis determined by the "drive towards mutual determination of the ego through itself" ("Trieb nach Wechselbestimmung des Ich durch sich selbst") or the drive towards absolute unity and perfection of the ego in itself ("Trieb nach absolute Einheit und Vollendung des Ich in sich selbst") (23).
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(23) I, 326.
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The categorical imperative as the absolute impulse that is grounded in itself.
It is the impulse that has itself for its goal which strives to create itself (and thereby the harmony in the ego, of which the latter is aware): i.e. the absolute drive: "der Trieb um des Triebens willen." To this, FICHTE adds: "If it is expressed in terms of a law, as for the very sake of this determination at a certain point of reflection it should be expressed, then it must be established that a law for the very sake of the law is an absolute law, or the categorical imperative: — You ought unconditionally. It is easy to understand, where in such an impulse the undetermined moment lies: it drives us, namely, out into the indefinite without an aim (the categorical imperative is merely formal without any object [Gegenstand])" (24).
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(24) I, 327: "Drückt man es als Gesetz aus, wie es gerade um dieser Bestimmung willen auf einem gewissen Reflexionspunkt ausgedrückt werden muss, so ist ein Gesetz um des Gesetzes willen ein absolutes Gesetz, oder der kategorische Imperativ: Du sollst schlechthin. Wo bei einem solchem Triebe das unbestimmte liege, lässt sich leicht einsehen; nemlich er treibt uns ins unbestimmte hinaus, ohne Zweck (der kategorische Imperativ ist bloss formal ohne allen Gegenstand)."
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If now action and impulse are to determine one another reciprocally, the object produced by the action (i.e. the effect of the drive which can be intuited in the theoretically determinable sense-world) must be determined by the impulse and agree with the "ideal of longing". Conversely, the impulse must be intuited in the reflection itself, as desiring this object alone. In this case the longing striving finds its consummation. But since the longing and striving in their very essence cannot be completed, the ego must again be driven out away from the feeling of harmony and into the infinite.
The "Du sollst" remains, entirely in the Kantian line, "ewige, nimmer erfüllbare Aufgabe" (an eternal task, never to be fully accomplished).
In FICHTE's identity-philosophy, the Humanist-ideal of personality in its moralistic sense has, to be sure, absorbed the science-ideal entirely along the line of the continuity-postulate of freedom, but, as we saw continually, at the cost of sanctioning the antinomy.
FICHTE's dithyramb on the ideal of personality: "Ueber die Würde des Menschen" (On the dignity of man).
Dithyrambically FICHTE sings the praise of this ideal of personality in the address "Ueber die Würde des Menschen" delivered at the close of his philosophical lectures in 1794: "Only from man does orderly arrangement spread around him up to the limit of his observation, — and when he extends the latter to a greater distance, order and harmony are extended too to the same degree. His observation indicates the place of all things in their infinite diversity, so that no single one may suppress the other; it brings unity into the infinite diversity.
"Through this the celestial bodies maintain themselves together, and become only one organized body; through this the suns turn in their determined orbits. Through the ego the gigantic ladder (of entities) rises from the lichen up to the seraph; in it is the system of the entire world of spirits, and man expects with reason, that the law which he imposes on himself and on this world, must be valid for the latter; he expects with reason the future universal recognition of the same. In the ego lies the sure pledge that from it order and harmony shall be extended ad infinitum where it is lacking until now; that with the expanding human culture at the same time the culture of the universe shall expand. Everything which still lacks form and order, shall be resolved into the most beautiful order, and what is already harmonious shall — according to laws not developed till now — become continually more harmonious. Man shall bring order into the confusion, and a plan into the general destruction; through him shall putrefaction produce form, and death summon to a new glorious life. This is man, when we consider him merely as observing intelligence; what would he not be, when we think him as practically active power!"(25).
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(25) I, 413: "Allein von Menschen aus verbreitet sich Regelmäßigkeit rund um ihm herum bis an die Grenze seiner Beobachtung, — und wie er diese weiter vorrückt, wird Ordnung und Harmonie weiter vorgerückt. Seine Beobachtung weist dem bis ins unendliche verschiedenen, jedem seinen Platz an, dass keines das andere verdränge; sie bringt Einheit in die unendliche Verschiedenheit.
Durch sie erhalten sich die Weltkörper zusammen, und werden nur Ein organisierter Körper; durch sie drehen die Sonnen sich in ihren angewiesen Bahnen. Durch das Ich steht die ungeheure Stufenfolge da von der Flechte bis zum Seraph; in ihn ist das System der ganzen Geisterwelt, und der Mensch erwartet mit Recht, dass das Gesetz, das er sich und ihr giebt, für sie gelten müsse; erwartet mit Recht die einstige allgemeine Anerkennung desselben. Im Ich liegt das sichere Unterpfand, das von ihm aus ins unendliche Ordnung und Harmonie sich verbreiten werde wo jetzt noch keine ist; dass mit der fortrückenden Cultur des Menschen, zugleich die Cultur des Weltalls fortrücken werde. Alles was jetzt noch unförmlich und ordnungsloss ist, wird durch den Menschen in die schönste Ordnung sich auflösen, und was jetzt schon harmonisch ist, wird -- nach bis jetzt unentwickelten Gesetzen — immer harmonischer werden. Der Mensch wird Ordnung in das Gewühl, und einen Plan in die allgemeine Zerstörung hineinbringen; durch ihn wird die Verwesung bilden, und der Tod zu einem neuen herrlichen Leben rufen. Das ist der Mensch, wenn wir ihn bloss als beobachtende Intelligenz ansehen; was ist er erst, wenn wir ihn als praktisch-thätiges Vermögen denken!"
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The passion for power in FICHTE's ideal of personality. The science-ideal converts itself into a titanic ideal of culture.
The Faustian passion for power in the Humanistic science-ideal has dissolved itself into the passion for power in the personality-ideal. The science-ideal has converted itself into a moralistic ideal of culture that comes to full expression in titanic activity! (26).
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(26) This conversion of the authentic ideal of science into a culture-ideal comes pregnantly to expression in FICHTE's writing "Die Bestimmung des Menschen" which appeared in 1800, (W.W. vol. II, pp. 267 ff).
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There is, however, no longer any place for the science-ideal in its earlier sense which hypostatized "nature" in its mathematical and mechanical functions, in order to extend the continuity of natural-scientific thought across all modal boundaries of the aspects. With respect to FICHTE's system, WINDELBAND justly writes: "Nature has meaning only as material for the performance of our duty. Therefore FICHTE's doctrine does not embrace a natural philosophy in the earlier sense of the word. He could not have given such a philosophy, since — apparently because of the one-sidedness of his education as a youth — he lacked any detailed knowledge of natural science. However, the very principles of his philosophy did not permit him to project it. The doctrine of science could not consider nature as a causal mechanism existing in itself" (27).
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(27) WINDELBAND, op. cit. II, 226 f: "Die Natur hat Sinn nur als Material unserer Pflichterfüllung. Deshalb gibt es für die Fichtesche Lehre keine Naturphilosophie im sonstigen Sinne des Wortes. Er hätte sie nicht geben können, weil ihm, wie es scheint bei der Einseitigkeit seiner Jugendbildung genaue und spezielle naturwissenschaftliche Kenntnisse mangelten. Aber die Prinzipien seiner Philosophie erlaubten sie ihm gar nicht. Als einen in sich besfehenden Kausal-mechanismus konnte die Wissenschaftslehre die Natur nicht betrachten."
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FICHTE could view nature neither as a mechanistic "world in itself", nor as an organic world immanently adapted to its own end. His teleological conception of nature had no other intention than to demonstrate in the dialectical way of his "Wissenschaftslehre" that nature, as it exists, must have been created by the free ego in order to render possible a resistance against the realization of its moral task (28).
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(28) For the rest, FICHTE did not abandon this standpoint, even in his fourth metaphysical period. Cf., e.g., his writing "Thatsachen des Bewusztseyns" (1810—'11), based on the Transzendentale Logik included in the first volume of the "Nachgelassene Werke" (W.W. vol. II, p. 663): "Die Natur ist Bild unserer realen Kraft, und so absolut zweckmässig; wir können in ihr und an ihr das was wir sollen. Ihr Prinzip ist schlechthin ein sittliches Prinzip, keinesweges ein Naturprincip (denn dann eben wäre sie absolut)..." ["Nature is the image of our real power and thus absolutely purposive, we can do in it and in respect to it what we ought to do. Its principle is simply a moral one, by no means a nature-principle (for in this very case it would be absolute)..."]
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The antinomy between the science-ideal and personality-ideal has actually converted itself in FICHTE's first period into an antinomy between Idea and sense within the personality-ideal itself.
In KANT's dualistic world-picture, the antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality actually implied the recognition of both factors. For FICHTE this antinomy is really converted into a contradiction within the personality-ideal itself between free activity (spontaneity) and bondage to the resistance of the lower nature or between "Idea" and sense (29).
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(29) See also the characteristic pages in Die Bestimmung des Menschen (The Vocation of Man) II, 313-319.
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KANT too had posed the latter antinomy in his Critique of practical Reason. The ideal of personality cannot cancel the bondage to sensory nature without dissolving itself into an empty abstraction. With the hypostatization of the moral norm, this antinomy must be retained. WINDELBAND justly remarks in this connection: "For this very reason the world is to FICHTE the posited contradiction, and dialectic is the method to know it" (30).
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(30) Op. cit. II, 227: "Eben deshalb ist die Welt für FICHTE der gesetzte Widerspruch und die Dialektik die Methode ihrer Erkenntnis."
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(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I/ Part 2/ Chapt 5/§3 pp 435-450)
