Galileo (le Giusto Sustermans 1636) Isaac Newton (le Godfrey Kneller 1689)
Leabhar 1 Earrann 2 Caibideil 1 § 3 -
AM POSTALAID LEANTANAIS SAN IDÈAL-SAIDHEINS DHAONNAIREACH AGUS AM BUN-ANTÌNOMI SAN IDÈA CHOSMONÒMAICH DHAONNAIREACH.
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Volume 1 Part 2 Chapter 1 § 3 -
THE POSTULATE OF CONTINUITY IN THE HUMANISTIC SCIENCE-IDEAL AND THE BASIC ANTINOMY IN THE HUMANISTIC COSMONOMIC IDEA
The new mathematical and naturalist science-ideal was typified by a particular postulate of continuity.
We have pointed out how the cosmic time-order grounds the modal aspects of reality in their sphere-sovereignty and brings them, at the same time, into a continuous temporal coherence (1). However, this cosmic order is eliminated, if mathematical thought is declared to be unconditionally sovereign in philosophy. For, if mathematical thought is sovereign, it can itself construe the coherence in the modal diversity of aspects. It need only eliminate the obstacles which the inner structures of the modal aspects of reality place in its way.
The cosmic temporal continuity in the inter-modal coherence of these aspects is then replaced by the mathematical-logical continuity in the movement of thought.
The same postulate of continuity of the mathematical ideal of science hides behind DESCARTES' universal methodical scepticism and HOBBES' experiment of thought mentioned above. Both sought theoretically to demolish the cosmos to a chaos, in order that it should be reconstrued, in a continuous procedure of mathematical and natural scientific thought, as a theoretical cosmos.
This postulate of continuity pre-supposed that, by virtue of its methodical sovereignty, mathematical thought has the power to surpass the modal boundaries of the diverse aspects of experience and temporal reality.
Modern natural science, founded by KEPPLER, GALILEO and NEWTON, turned away from the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of substance which was rooted in the Greek form-matter motive. Such in order to scientifically investigate the physical aspect of reality by means of analytical and synthetical mathematical thought. With its concept of function, modern science wished to grasp the functional coherence of physical phenomena in mathematically formulated natural laws.
It had — correctly in its own field — cleared away the old obstacles that had impeded the application of mathematical methods in natural-scientific research. Modern natural science discarded the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian view of the universe with its distinction between the sublunary and supra-lunary world. It also discarded the Aristotelian "qualitates occultae" and it proclaimed the universality of the laws of motion for the entire physical aspect of the cosmos (2). The Humanistic science-ideal, however, could not accept the limitation of this special scientific postulate of continuity to the field of physics.
GALILEO'S postulate for the modern physical method implied a reduction of all qualitative distinctions, in the sense of scholastic "qualitates occultae", to mathematically determined differences of motion. According to its science-ideal, Humanistic philosophy now sought to apply this postulate to all other aspects of reality in order to construe a continuous mechanical image of the world.
The concept of substance in the new Humanistic metaphysics is quite different from the Aristotelian-Thomistic or Platonic one.
In its first phase the science-ideal pointed towards the development of a new metaphysics. It was supposed that the true essence, the super-temporal substance of "reality in itself" could only be grasped by the new mathematical method of thought. However, even in the Monadology of LEIBNIZ, this new concept of substance does not have anything to do with the substantial forms of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, which were grounded in a lex aeterna.
The new concept of substance, if it is viewed in the light of the new Humanistic science-ideal, has in essence a nominalistic background. It is nothing but the hypostasis of the concept of function of the new scientific method. And this concept of function specifies the common denominator under which the science-ideal wishes to bring the different modal aspects of reality. It is, as it was defined by LEIBNIZ, the hypostasis of the modern functional concept of law. The functional coherence between variant phenomena, construed by thought, becomes the "invariant", the substance of reality (3).
Do not let us forget, that the new mathematical natural science had its precursor in the Occamistic school at the University of Paris during the 14th century. Remember, that before GALILEO the new concept of the law of motion was formulated in full mathematical precision by NICOLAUS OF ORESME who also anticipated the discovery of COPERNICUS and invented the method of analytical geometry before DESCARTES. The whole functionalistic conception of reality was rooted in a nominalistic tradition.
The fact, that the "substance" of nature was still conceived of as "Ding an sich", in spite of the choice of the Archimedean point in the mathematical cogito, proves, that before KANT Humanist philosophy had not yet arrived at critical self-refection and was unaware of the very root of its science-ideal. It proves, that Humanistic thought was still formally wed to ancient and medieval thought; but it proves nothing against the new character of this concept of substance!
Therefore, one must be extremely careful in drawing consequences from an external agreement in the scholastic-Aristotelian and modern-Humanistic definition of this concept.
When DESCARTES defines substance as "res quae ita existit, ut nulla alia rē indigeat ad existendum" (Print. I, 51), this definition sounds rather the same as the one we find, for example, in JOHANNES DAMASCENUS (Dial. 4, 1 p. 538) and later on in SUAREZ (Disp., xxx, p. 299). And the definition which DESCARTES gives in his Rationes more geometrico dispositae (p. 86 V and VI) : "omnis res cui inest immediate, ut in subjecto, sive per quam existet aliquid quod percipimus, ... vocatur substantia," is to be found again in rather the same formulation in ARISTOTLE'S Categ., c. 5, a 12.
In itself this agreement only indicates, that the metaphysical concept of substance ever rests upon the hypostatization of theoretical abstractions. But, even in view of this, we may not close our eyes to the new peculiar sense which the concept of substance acquires in Humanistic philosophy. It is the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea which is responsible for this new meaning. In this Humanistic philosophy the criterion of truth is not sought in an agreement between thought and "the essence of reality outside of our mind." It is sought in thought itself with the "more geometrico" attained clearness and distinctness of concepts (4). This thought no longer finds its supposed fulcrum in a transcendent world of ideas reposing in itself, nor in the Aristotelian entelechies, which in a teleological world-order are inherent in the world of material things as its substantial forms. Thought now granted to itself a logically creating sovereignty. According to its own intention, it only rests upon a mathematical method which freely rules over "empirical" reality. The clear mathematical concept is above everything else.
Besides, the metaphysical concept of substance is absolutely not essential to the Humanistic ideal of science. When the Humanistic metaphysics of nature collapsed under the critique of BERKELEY, LOCKE, HUME and KANT, the mathematical concept of function or the transcendental form of thought rendered the same service as the common denominator under which philosophical thought could subsume the aspects of reality. In keeping with the Humanistic ideal of science reason must employ the method of continuity as the scepter of its absolute sovereignty. It must exceed all modal boundaries.
The lex continui in LEIBNIZ and in the Marburg school of Neo-Kantians.
LEIBNIZ, still entirely caught in the pre-critical Humanistic metaphysics, even elevated this method to a metaphysical law: the lex continui. He gave it a scientific foundation in the differential calculus, his great discovery in mathematics. In the XXth century the anti-metaphysical neo-Kantian Marburg school, radically broke with the Ding an sich, but, nevertheless, elevated the "lex continui" to the basic law of philosophical thought.
The Humanistic ideal of science can call into play its postulate of continuity in various forms; in the form of Humanistic metaphysics, in that of the transcendental "critical" thought, and also in the form of the positivistic philosophy of the last century (COMTE). It can ground this postulate in a metaphysical concept of substance, but also in the continuity of the movement of thought which arises out of a basic correlation of abstracting and combining (NATORP), or in a positivistically conceived natural scientific method.
In all these forms this postulate of continuity opposes the subjection of philosophical thought to the cosmic-temporal order originating in the Divine plan of creation. However, the sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects did not permit itself simply to be eliminated by the supposed continuity of a scientific method. The Humanistic science-ideal has led philosophy into a maze of antinomies. Every time philosophical thought tried to surpass the modal boundaries of the different aspects by means of a mathematical or mechanistic method, it punished itself by becoming involved in antinomies. In tracking down these intrinsic antinomies we shall later on discover a method of testing the correctness of our theory of the modal aspects of experience.
The fundamental antinomy in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea.
At this stage we only wish to point out, that the consistent following out of the naturalistic ideal of science must reveal a fundamental antinomy in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea. This science-ideal, evoked by the ideal of personality, acknowledged no limits to the application of the new natural scientific method. Had not scientific thought been emancipated from the cosmic order and declared "unconditionally" sovereign?
But the moment must come when personality, the new sovereign in the Humanistic ground-motive which had glorified itself in its absolute freedom, must itself fall a prey to this ideal of science. Personality had been absolutized in its temporal functions of reason. The physical and biological functions had been subjected to the domination of the mathematical and mechanical method of thought. The postulate of logical continuity implied, that the psychical, logical, historical, linguistical, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical, ethical, and faith-functions of personality must also be subjected to the naturalistic science-ideal. Thereby, the latter dealt a death blow to the sovereignty of the ideal of personality! "Die ich rief, die Geister, Werde ich nun nicht los!"
In the consistent carrying out of its postulate of continuity, the ideal of science must abolish the ideal of personality and unmask the Idea of its unconditional freedom as an illusion.
The supposed solution of this antinomy in transcendental thought.
As we saw in an earlier context, the transcendental-idealistic trend in Humanistic philosophy thinks, that since KANT and FICHTE this fundamental antinomy has been solved in a definitive way.
The discovery of the transcendental cogito had opened the way to self-reflection of thought, and had brought to light the absolute dependence of all natural scientific syntheses upon the transcendental-logical function of the ego. And the latter can never be made into a Gegenstand. Therefore, was it not true, that this discovery had established insurmountable boundaries for the naturalistic science-ideal, and fully guaranteed the absolute freedom of the rational functions over against the natural law of causality?
However, we have seen, that the conception of the "Unbedingtheit" of the "transcendental cogito" involves Humanistic philosophy in new antinomies. "Reason" in its supposed autonomy should here appoint the boundaries of the ideal of science. In fact, it was nothing but the reaction of a threatened ideal of personality which established the illusive conviction, that by means of "pure thought" the absolutism of the nature-motive in its transcendental ground-Idea could be bridled.
Let us grant that the Humanist thinkers, who consistently followed the classical science-ideal, were guilty of a primitive naturalism, insofar as they supposed it to be possible to comprehend actual thought in a natural scientific manner. But the Kantian transcendental philosophy in no way denounced the expansion of the natural scientific method over the total concrete act of thinking in its empirical temporal character. It subsumed this latter without the least scruple under a naturalistically conceived, psychological common denominator of the ideal of science. Modern transcendental philosophy only wished to limit the science-ideal by means of a hypostatization of a "transcendental-logical subject", which should be elevated above the inter-modal coherence of meaning between the different aspects of the concrete act of thought. As soon as the untenability of this presupposition is seen, it must become evident, that transcendental idealism is helpless in the face of the absolutistic pretension of the naturalistic science-ideal.
In keeping with the latter, this idealism can in fact only accept a cosmic determinateness of the empirical act of thought in the specific sense of a natural scientific relation of causality. Only the flight into an idealistic absolutization can procure to the Humanistic ideal of personality an apparent security against the consequences of the science-ideal with its postulate of continuity.
Consequently, we must establish the fact, that the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic thought in its basic structure discloses the irreconcilable conflict inherent in its religious ground-motive.
By the latter Humanistic philosophy seems to be placed in the face of an inexorable "either-or".
A new struggle for primacy, this time for the ideal of science, and then for the ideal of personality, was unchained. And in this struggle no objective judge was present.
The tendency of continuity in the freedom-motive of the ideal of personality.
The ideal of personality, too, sought support in rational functions (which were isolated by theoretical thought in an intermodal synthesis of meaning). And its freedom-motive possesses the same tendency of continuity as the science-ideal which did not recognize heteronomous limits.
The attempt, soon to be made by KANT, to delineate the boundaries of each must lead to new antinomies, which we shall examine more closely in their proper places. After he had ascribed the primacy to the freedom-motive, the dialectical development of Humanistic thought offers a really fascinating spectacle.
I think, the more detailed exposition in the following chapters, which begins with the conflict between DESCARTES and HOBBES, and must be concluded with the last phase of FICHTE'S idealism, will gain perspective by letting precede a brief diorama of the whole dialectical development of the Humanistic ground-motive in post-Kantian thought up to the most recent phase.
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(1) Translator's note: Since meaning is the mode of being of all created existence, a temporal coherence is a coherence of meaning. However, for stylistic reasons I shall use the abbreviated form "temporal coherence" in italics. D. H. F.
(2) For the details of the genesis of this new concept of science compare my In the Struggle for a Christian Politics, Chapter I, VI and VII (A.R. Staatkunde, Vol. I). See also the literature cited in this series.
(3) Thus, explicitly in LEIBNIZ' Hauptschr. 11 S., 292f. and 340, where substance is defined as the "abiding law for a series of changes".
(4) Even in NICOLAUS CUSANUS this changed attitude toward knowledge is evident. See my In the Struggle for a Christian Politics. In DILTHEY I have encountered a relative agreement with my conception of the modern "cogito" as Archimedian point. (See A. METZGER, Phänomenologie and Metaphysik, 1933, pp. 17ff.). However, DILTHEY sees a Christian metaphysical background behind this "cogito".
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(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I/ Part 2/ Chapt 1 /§3 pp 200-207)
