Leibniz (le Christoph Bernhard Francke, 1700)
§2 - GNÈ IDÈALACH-MATAMATAIGEACH NA GRÙNND-IDÈA TAR-CHEUMNAIL DAONNAIRICH.
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§2 - THE MATHEMATICAL-IDEALISTIC TYPE OF HUMANIST TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA.
It is not our intention to write a history of modern philosophy. Consequently, we shall not discuss the Cartesian circle of Jansenism at Port Royal, which soon united Cartesian philosophy with Christian-Augustinian and neo-Platonic-Augustinian motives. Nor shall we discuss the similar attempts at synthesis undertaken by the Occasionalists, which encountered strong opposition from orthodox Cartesians.
Our purpose is only to investigate the development of the polar tensions within Humanist philosophy itself in a few of its most representative systems. Consequently, we shall examine these tensions separately and apart from the complications which arise by the intrinsically contradictory union of the Humanist with the scholastic-Christian "realist" standpoint in philosophy.
We must then first fix our attention upon the great refinement of the polar tension between the mathematical science-ideal and the ideal of personality in the philosophy of LEIBNIZ.
The supposed Thomistic-Aristotelian traits in LEIBNIZ' Philosophy.
It is usual to speak of a reconciliation in LEIBNIZ between the new mathematical and mechanical view of nature and the teleological Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of substantial forms. Indeed, in many respects LEIBNIZ himself has provided the occasion for this misunderstanding. In his copious letter to JACOB THOMASIUS (April 20/30 1669) he spoke of such a reconciliation and up till the last period of his life we find statements in this same strain. The letter that he sent to REMOND DE MONTMORT in the year 1715 (Philos. Schriften ed. by ERDMANN (1), p. 701 f.) is note-worthy in this connection.
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(1) For the most part my own quotations will be taken from this edition of LEIBNIZ' works. The quotations from GERHARDT'S edition are only supplementary and refer to papers which are not in ERDMANN. Even though GERHARDT'S edition contains much additional material, it is sometimes inaccurate.
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And also by continually emphasizing the Idea of the "perennis philosophia" he seems to be pointing in this direction. Did not LEIBNIZ intend to unite in his system all the philosophical motives of his predecessors? WINDELBAND even speaks of a "Platonic idealism" in LEIBNIZ' doctrine of the "eternal verities". Actually one can find in LEIBNIZ the seemingly realist idealistic thesis that the "eternal verities"(2) exist "in quadam regione idearum", namely in God.
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(2) LOCKE'S nominalist standpoint is not doubted. Yet he, too, speaks of "eternal relations between the Ideas" (Essay concerning human understanding iv, 1 para. 9). He is only referring to ethical and mathematical Ideas which are created by thought itself. This conception of the Ideas as a creation of thought itself is incompatible with a veritable realism of Ideas.
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And in his letter concerning Platonic philosophy (1797 Erdm. p. 445), he identifies this very conception with the Platonic doctrine of an intelligible world.
Nevertheless, there is absolutely no evidence of an actual realistic conception of Ideas in LEIBNIZ' metaphysics. His transcendental ground-Idea recognizes no other Ἀρχή but mathematical thought in its deified form.
As appears from his paper De Rerum Originatione radicali (p. 148) written in 1697, the origin of the cosmos is sought by him in a "mathesis quaedam divina sive mechanismus metaphysicus" which is incomprehensible only to the finite mind, but functions in God as creative thought.
Even in his doctor's thesis, Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui (defended by LEIBNIZ in 1663 when seventeen years old) he chose the side of nominalism. In this thesis he only gave evidence of a rather superficial knowledge of scholastic philosophy. In his Dissertatio de stilo philosophico Nizolii (1670) he called the sect of nominalists "omnium inter scholasticas profundissima" and considered it to be in absolute agreement with the modern way of philosophizing (3).
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(3) ERDMANN, p. 68: "secta Nominalium, omnium inter scholasticas profundissima, et hodiernae reformatae philosophandi rationi congruentissima; quae quum olim maxime floreret, nunc, apud scholasticos quidem, extincta est. Unde conjicias decrementa potius quam augmenta acuminis." A little further on, however, LEIBNIZ observes: "Idem dicendum est de nostri temporis philosophicae Reformatoribus, eos si non plusquam Nominales tamen Nominales esse fere omnes".
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It will subsequently become evident that LEIBNIZ remained a nominalist in his entire further course of development. In speaking of nominalism here we mean the type, dominated by a modern Humanistic ground-Idea, which starts from the primacy of the classical Humanistic science-ideal and holds to supra-arbitrary fundamentals of the latter. This moderate nominalism — in contrast with the extreme kind of HOBBES — maintains the intrinsic (supposedly supra-temporal) necessity of the logical relations of thought (4).
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(4) LEIBNIZ' treatise concerning the philosophical style of NIZOLIUS, to which we have referred, contains a veritable panegyric of the basic tenets of nominalism. In it he opposed the extreme nominalism of HOBBES according to whom truth would only be a property of language and "qui, ut verum fatear, mihi plusquam nominalis videtur." "Non contentus enim cum Nominalibus universalia ad nomina reducere, ipsam, rerum veritatem ait in nominibus consistere." [which, to be true, seems to me to be more than nominalist." "For, not being satisfied by reducing, in accordance with the nominalists, the universalia to names, he contends that the very truth of things consists in the latter"].
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In his Dissertatio de solo philosophico Nizolii, quoted above, LEIBNIZ testified that nearly all thinkers of his day who aimed at a "reformation" of philosophy, were nominalists in this sense. If they were not nominalistic in this sense they were "plusquam Nominales", that is to say they went further than WILLIAM OF OCCAM, GREGORIUS OF RIMINI, GABRIEL BIEL and a number of thinkers of the Augustinian order who adhered to nominalism in its moderate form (5).
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(5) ERDMANN p. 69.
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It was this moderate nominalism which maintained itself in LEIBNIZ' mature thought in the doctrine of "vérités éternelles", in the sense of eternal logical possibilities which reside in the creative mathematical thought of God. We shall discuss this later.
It is no reconciliation between the modern science-ideal and a scholastic doctrine of substantial forms, which lies at the foundation of LEIBNIZ' philosophical endeavour. Rather his system manifests the increasing tension between the two factors of his Humanistic ground-motive. This tension puts its stamp upon his metaphysics; and the solution which he attempted to give to the fundamental antinomy in his Humanistic ground-Idea must be considered as the greatest that Humanistic thought was able to attain during the phase of the primacy of the science-ideal. This will become evident from our further analysis.
The fact that in his metaphysics LEIBNIZ again introduced Aristotelian terms such as: entelechy, materia prima et secunda, potentiality and actuality, actus purus, causa efficiens and causa finalis, should not lead us astray and make us oblivious of the modern Humanistic sense which he ascribed to these terms. Let us not forget, that, by virtue of his education in the scholastic philosophy of MELANCHTON, he had become familiar with this terminology.
The secularization of the motive of nature and grace in LEIBNIZ' philosophy.
Even the scholastic contrast between the sphere of nature and the sphere of grace and the Idea of the subservience of the former to the latter reappears in LEIBNIZ. But he ascribes to this dialectical motive a completely different meaning. Even from this it is clearly evident, that his philosophy is not grounded in a scholastic accommodation of the Greek basic motive to that of Christian thought (as in THOMAS), but that it is rooted solely in the Humanistic immanence-standpoint.
In LEIBNIZ the sphere of grace never means anything but the realm of rational creatures who are in possession of freedom by clear and distinct thought. And the sphere of nature is only the realm of creatures who lack this freedom. In the former the deity (pure reason) displays itself as the most wise monarch; in the latter, as the most perfect architect. In the first, laws are ethical, and in the second, mechanical (6).
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(6) Principes de la nature el de la grâce (1714) 15 (ERDMANN 717): "C'est pourquoi tous les esprits, soit des hommes, soit des génies entrant en vertu de la raison et des vérités éternelles dans une espèce de société avec Dieu, sont des membres de la Cité de Dieu, c'est à dire, du plus parfait état, formé et gouverné par le plus grand et le meilleur des Monarques, où il n'y a point de crime sans châtiment, point de bonnes actions sans récompense proportionée; et enfin, autant de vertu et de bonheur qu'il est possible; et cela, non pas par un dérangement de la Nature comme si ce que Dieu prépare aux âmes troubloit les loix des corps; mais par l'ordre même des choses naturelles, en vertu de l'harmonie préétablie de tout temps entre les Règnes de la Nature et de la Grâce." [Principles of nature and grace: "Therefore all spirits, either of men or of genii, entering by means of reason and the eternal verities into a sort of society with God, are members of the City of God, that is to say of the most perfect state, formed and governed by the greatest and the best of monarchs; where there is not any crime without punishment, not any good deed without proportionate recompense; and finally as much virtue and happiness as is possible; and such not by means of a disarrangment of Nature, as if that which God prepares for the souls should disturb the laws of the bodies; but by the very order of natural things, by virtue of the harmony preestablished for all times between the Realms of Nature and of Grace."]
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In this way also AUGUSTINE'S Christian conception of the Civitas Dei becomes denaturated in LEIBNIZ' speculative metaphysics. AUGUSTINE'S conception is reduced to an Idea of a constitutional kingdom in which the deity reigns by the grace of metaphysical-mathematical thought. The creative will of the deity is bound to the eternal metaphysical verities of the latter. LEIBNIZ' Humanistic secularization of the Christian religion received its most evident expression in his conception of sin as a privatio. At first sight this conception seems to be orientated to that of AUGUSTINE, but actually it is entirely Cartesian. LEIBNIZ holds sin to be a lack of (mathematical) distinctness and clearness in conception, because of which the will does not arrive at a correct judgment.
The refinement of the postulate of continuity in the science-ideal by means of LEIBNIZ' mathematical concept of function. The discovery of differential and integral calculus.
Let me now point out the intensive enrichment which the mathematical Humanistic science-ideal acquires in LEIBNIZ by the application of the mathematical concept of function which he introduced.
This concept, discovered in the differential and integral calculus, afforded an extremely fruitful and fine instrument of thought (7).
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(7) As it appears from GERHARDT'S publication of LEIBNIZ' scientific writings, the discovery of differential and integral calculus took place during LEIBNIZ' stay in Paris in the years 1673-76. He first published the basic principles of this new calculus in 1684 and 1686 in two treatises entitled Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis and De geometria recondita et analyse indivisibilium atque infinitorum. As is generally known these publications involved him in an unpleasant controversy with NEWTON, who had designed his fluctional calculus in 1665/6. The dispute centered around the priority of both discoveries. It is established, that LEIBNIZ' discovery is entirely independent of NEWTON'S.
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It was assimilated into the Cartesian science-ideal. Consequently, by infinitesimally small transitions of thought it became possible to carry through the postulate of continuity of this science-ideal across the boundaries of the modal aspects. And, in addition, the crass materialism of HOBBES and the crass dualism of DESCARTES could thereby be avoided.
The principle of continuity that LEIBNIZ indicates as the final basis of his analysis is everywhere presented by him as a regulative principle and a logical method of thought.
If we view two series of values of variable magnitudes which are joined with each other by a fixed law, then, if we approach the limits of both, the functional relation, existing among the members of the two series, may not be viewed as abolished.
From a sensory viewpoint these limiting cases, in contrast to the remaining elements, may appear as entirely heterogeneous, just as rest and motion, equality and inequality, parallellism and intersection of lines must appear as irreconcilable contradictions in the direct sensory intuition. But this cleft, existing for our sensory perception, must be bridged over by thought. When two isolated elements are contrasted with each other, it may seem, that the one is utterly dissimilar to the other. Yet, if the former can be deduced and developed from the latter in a continuous logical process, their connection gains a higher and more securely grounded character, than any sensory perceptible agreement would have made possible (8).
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(8) CASSIRER, Das Erkenntnisproblem (The problem of knowledge) vol II, p. 158.
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LEIBNIZ himself formulated the main principle of this new calculus as follows: "If a continuous transition is given which ends in a final term, then it is always possible to introduce a common rational calculus (rationationen communem instituere) which likewise includes the final term" (9).
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(9) In his treatise: Cum prodiisset atque increbuisset Analysis mea infinitesimalis (Historia et Origio Calc. differ. ed. by GERHARDT, p. 40, quoted in CASSIRER, loc. cit.).
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This brilliant discovery which was made in the infinitesimal calculus was to become one of the strongest foundations for the progress of modern physics. However, at the same time it became a metaphysical instrument of the Humanistic mathematical science-ideal.
The concept of function and the principle of continuity become metaphysical, when employed in the attempt logically to bridge over the modal boundaries of meaning of the different law-spheres and to reduce in the last analysis the whole cosmic coherence in the modal diversity of meaning to a logical and mathematical one. This was attempted according to the ideal that had animated Humanistic philosophy since DESCARTES, viz. the "mathesis universalis", as a universal method of thought.
The two roots of LEIBNIZ' philosophy. The misunderstanding in SCHMALENBACH concerning the Calvinistic origin of LEIBNIZ' individualism.
In LEIBNIZ' metaphysics this attempt was undertaken in a truly masterly manner. SCHMALENBACH, in his extensive study of LEIBNIZ, examined the logicistic-arithmetical basic Idea which is the primary root in LEIBNIZ' metaphysics (10).
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(10) HERMAN SCHMALENBACH, Leibniz (Drei Masken-Verlag, München,1921). In the meanwhile one should bear in mind that "arithmeticism" is here used in the sense of the concept of function of differential calculus. LEIBNIZ comprehended the latter as a universal method of analysis. He applied it with equal facility to number, space and motion, and to the field of biology and psychology.
In his work "Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis" (Meditations on knowledge, truth and ideas), LEIBNIZ still defended the conception that number, as a sum of static units, is the metaphysical basic Idea of the cosmos and arithmetic is a sort of "statica of the universum". Later on he abandoned this view and held that a discrete element is only a function of the mathematical principle of progression, and number itself is only the simplest instance of the general relation of thought. Thus LEIBNIZ is actually a logicist in his mathematical conception.
It is, however, incorrect to suppose that he thereby abandoned in his metaphysics the arithmetical standpoint as such In his book Leibniz' System in seinen wissensch. Grundlagen (1902) and in the second vol. of his Erkenntnisproblem, CASSIRER erroneously arrives at this conclusion on the basis of his own epistemological conception of the calculus of infinity. LEIBNIZ' monadology actually arose, as SCHMALENBACH has shown in detail, in conscious opposition to metaphysical space-universalism, just as much as to materialistic atomism. It rests upon the hypostatization of the differential -number.
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However, under the influence of MAX WEBER, he wrongly thought, that the root of this arithmeticism itself — by means of which the science-ideal now rationalized individuality — is to be found in "Calvinistic religiosity". This was a fundamental misunderstanding both of the latter and of the true religious ground-motive of LEIBNIZ' arithmeticism. Rather this religious motive is to be sought in the individualistic and rationalistic Humanistic ideal of personality at the inception of the „Aufklärung".
The differential-number became a monad in a metaphysical sense; it became the true noumenal unity of reality which lies at the foundation of all compound phenomena. These monads fill the noumenal cosmos in gapless density. They were thought of as animate beings which in their representations reflect, each in its proper way, the universe, but which, with respect to each other, sustain an absolutely closed, self-sufficient existence. Just as such they come to be the expression of the Humanistic ideal of personality in its individualistic and rationalist conception.
In this way the noumenal metaphysical cosmos was resolved into an infinite multitude of "windowless" monads, spaceless, animated points of force. The lex continui which originates out of mathematical thought maintains a continuous coherence of meaning between them and between the different modal aspects of their inner world. In LEIBNIZ' system this result was attained without it being necessary to subsume the entire cosmos under a mechanistic basic denominator.
BRUNO'S aesthetically tinted individualism in his conception of the monad as a microcosmos was transformed by LEIBNIZ into a mathematical one. The Idea of microcosmos, the Idea of the "omnia ubique" in the Humanistic ideal of personality as it was conceived during the Renaissance, was rationalised. The mathematical science-ideal reduced the individual with its qualitative individuality to a function of the principle of progression and thereby made the individual accessible to rational calculation. In this way, by the lex continui, the self-sufficient individuality of the monads (11), as an expression of the ideal of personality, was reconciled to the ideal of science.
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(11) La Monadologie (1714): "On pouvroit donner le nom d'Entéléchies à toutes les substances simples ou Monades créées, car elles ont en elles une certaine perfection (ἐχουσι τὸ ἐντελές), il y une suffisance (αὐτάρκεια), qui les rend sources de leur actions internes..." (ERDMANN, 706). [The name of Entelechies might be given to all simple substances or created Monads, for they have a certain perfection in themselves, a kind of self-sufficience (autarky) which enables them to be the sources of their own internal activity...].
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LEIBNIZ' concept of force and the motive of activity in the ideal of personality.
The individual self-sufficiency of personality and the motive of infinite activity had from the very beginning been predominant in the Humanistic ideal of personality as it was conceived of the during the Renaissance. And now both of these moments could be expressed in the metaphysics of the science-ideal. In the Cartesian system the tendency of activity in the ideal of personality could not, as in BRUNO, penetrate the Idea of the cosmos itself. The "res extensiva" as a natural substance is, in DESCARTES, a part of absolutized static space of which motion is only a modus.
In contrast with this, LEIBNIZ hypostatized the concept of force, introduced by NEWTON in physics, and made it into the essence of the monad-substance, which as a self-sufficient microcosmos does not permit any outside influence. In LEIBNIZ this metaphysical concept of force appears in the outward Aristotelian form of "entelechy" and "causa-finalis", but is not actually to be interpreted in an Aristotelian sense (12).
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(12) In his Système Nouv. de la Nature (1695) LEIBNIZ observed: "Il fallut donc rappeller et comme réhabiliter les formes substantielles, si decriées aujourd'hui; mais d'une manière qui les rendit intelligibles, et qui sépara l'usage qu'on en doit faire de l'abus qu'on en a fait" (ERDMANN, pag. 124).
["It was thus necessary to recall and as it were to rehabilitate the substantial forms which have been so much reviled nowadays; but in a manner which rendered them intelligible and separated the use which is to be made of them from the abuse which has been made of the same"].
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Rather it is penetrated by the motive of activity in the Humanistic ideal of personality. In this modern sense it is opposed to Cartesian metaphysics. Continuous static space is no longer considered to be the essence of nature, but instead its essence is sought in the working force.
Space and time are in LEIBNIZ only ideal arrangements of phenomena. The first is an arrangement or relation of coexistence; the second is an arrangement or relation of succession. Space is, as LEIBNIZ wrote in his fourth letter to CLARKE: "Cet ordre qui fait que les corps sont situables, et par lequel ils ont une situation entre eux en existant ensemble" (13).
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(13) ERDMANN, p. 758. ["This order which makes it possible for bodies to be localized and by which in their coexistence they have a situation in relation to one another"].
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Regulated by the laws of physical motion, mechanical matter (LEIBNIZ called it "materia secunda") is only the mode of appearance of the metaphysical force which belongs to the essence of the monad, "un phénomène, mais bien fondé, résultant des Monades" (14).
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(14) It is again evident that LEIBNIZ uses the scholastic-Aristotelian terms materia prima et secunda in a totally modified sense. Materia prima has become the substantial force of the monads which is the metaphysical cause of inert matter in the world of appearance: the materia secunda. Compare LEIBNIZ' letter to REMOND DE MONTFORT (ERDMANN, p. 124): "Quant à l'inertie de la matière, comme la matière elle même n'est autre chose qu'un phénomène, mais bien fondé, résultant des Monades: il n'en est de même de l'inertie, qui est une propriété de ce phénomène." ["Just like matter itself is nothing but a phenomenon, but a well-founded one, resulting from the Monads, the same holds good in respect to the inertness of matter, which is a property of this phenomenon"].
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In this fashion the dynamical motive of the ideal of personality penetrated infinite nature itself. There is no trace of a real revival of the Aristotelian concept of entelechy in LEIBNIZ. The Idea of the autarchy, of the self-sufficiency of the monad is entirely in conflict with Aristotelian metaphysics, especially with the Aristotelian conception of the relation between soul and body. Moreover, LEIBNIZ' concept of force has essentially nothing to do with the Aristotelian doctrine of entelechies which is dominated by the Greek ground-motive of form and matter, and to which the titanic dunamis of the Humanistic ideal of personality and science is wholly foreign.
Meanwhile, in LEIBNIZ' metaphysics the ideal of personality reached a position of extremely intensive tension with the mathematical science-ideal. This tension was due to the fact that he tried to express the basic tendencies of the former in a metaphysics derived from the latter. LEIBNIZ did not for a moment wish to derogate from the primacy of the science-ideal. On the contrary, the Faustian motive of dominating nature by mathematic thought ruled him perhaps even more than it had his rationalistic predecessors.
Primacy of the mathematical science-ideal in LEIBNIZ' transcendental ground-Idea.
In LEIBNIZ' transcendental ground-Idea, the construction of the relation between totality and modal diversity in the coherence of meaning is completely left to the mathematical science-ideal.
This is evident in the first place from the theoretical common denominator under which he subsumes all modal aspects of experience, namely, the representation (perception) which he conceives as "représentation du composé, ou ce qui est dehors, dans le simple" [representation of the composite or what is outward, in the simple substance] (15).
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(15) ERDMANN, p. 714. Also compare Monadologie, 14 (ERDMANN, p. 706) : "L'état passager qui enveloppe et représente une multitude dans l'unité ou dans la substance simple, n'est autre chose que ce qu'on appelle la perception qu'on doit distinguer de l'apperception ou de la conscience." [The transitory state which envelopes and represents a multitude in a unity or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called the perception which is to be distinguished from the apperception or the consciousness]. Every monad is thus a unity in the multiplicity of its perceptions: "Car la simplicité de la substance n'empêche point la multiplicité des modifications, qui se doivent trouver ensemble dans cette même substance simple." Princ. de la Nat. et de la Grace 2. [For the simplicity of the substance does not prevent the multiplicity of the modifications which must be found together in this same simple substance].
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In LEIBNIZ' metaphysics, all monads, also the material ones have become perceiving points of force, which only in their representations reflect the coherence of the cosmos in its modal diversity of aspects. And once this rationalistic basic denominator had been established for the modal diversity of meaning, the mathematical lex continui of the science-ideal had gained complete control. For in LEIBNIZ' metaphysical conception of the world-order, all monads were arranged in a mathematically conceived progression (16).
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(16) This transcendental Idea of world-order outwardly reminds us of ARISTOTLE'S two-fold lex naturalis. It is, however in essence a mathematical construction. It arranges both the material and rational monads in a continuous progression, after the pattern of the calculus of infinity. And, proceeding from the lower to the higher, it places the deity, the central monad, at the apex.
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The monads do not differ because of a fundamental specific nature. The realistic Aristotelian conception of species is totally abandoned in LEIBNIZ' metaphysics. In fact, the qualitative difference between the monads has been quantified: it consists only in the degree of clarity of their perceptions in which the cosmos reflects itself and in the degree of the tendency to pass from one perception to the other: "And consequently a Monad in itself, and in the moment, could not be distinguished from another except by the properties and internal actions which can be nothing but these perceptions (that is to say, the representations of the composite, or of what is outward, in the simple) and its appetitions (that is to say, its tendencies to pass from one perception to the other) which are the principles of change" (17).
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(17) ERDMANN, p. 714: "Et par conséquent une Monade en elle même, et dans le moment, ne sauroit être discernée d'une autre que par les qualités et actions internes, lesquelles ne peuvent être autre chose que ces perceptions (c'est à dire, les représentations du composé, ou de ce qui est dehors, dans le simple) et de ses appétitions (c'est à dire, ses tendances d'une perception à l'autre), qui sont les principes du changement."
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A continuous ascending progression breaks through the discontinuity of the monads by passing from the unconscious perceptions (the so-called "petites perceptions" (18)) of the material monads, via the conscious, but confused representations of the sensory soul-monads, to the clear and distinct apperceptions of the limited spiritual monads.
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(18) The "unconscious perception" is thus conceived of as an infinitesimal degree of consciousness.
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And from thence it passes to the infinite creative mathematical thought of the deity, which is pure thought without sensory perceptions.
In this mathematical world-order man has his place between the two poles: matter and deity. In man, intelligence (mathematical thought) and sensation, activity and passivity, spontaneity, and receptivity occur together. Therefore, the human mind is limited in its thought, a limitation which is lacking in the deity, as "actus purus".
LEIBNIZ' Humanistic theism.
Ostensibly, an Aristotelian theism is here adhered to; however, in essence, the deity has become identical with the final hypostasis of the mathematical science-ideal. Theism passes — nearly imperceptibly -- into a logical-mathematical pantheism: "Harmonia universalis, id est Deus."
The infinite analysis of the entire cosmos is accomplished in God's thought alone; on this ground the world-order is in essence qualified as a purely mathematical coherence of meaning. This is true even though human thought, on account of its limitedness (that is, its metaphysical imperfection), cannot gain insight into the absolute mathematical necessity of a seemingly contingent event within the world of phenomena.
Logicization of the dynamical tendency in the ideal of personality.
Even though it more or less continued to be an irrationalistic residue in LEIBNIZ' system, the metaphysical concept of force, as an expression of the activity-motive in the ideal of personality, was rationalized as much as possible. The individualistic ideal of personality of the early "Enlightenment" did not permit any violation of the self-sufficiency of the individuum. And for the sake of the mathematical science-ideal, the entire activity of all the monads was subsumed under the basic denominator of representation (Vorstellung). Consequently, the metaphysical concept of force had to be accommodated to the latter (19):
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(19) This concept of force which arose from the ideal of personality, was a stumbling block for the neo-Kantians of the Marburg school because of its irrationalist predisposition. They deemed it to be in conflict with the postulate of continuity of pure thought. See COHEN, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 3e Aufl., p. 263/4.
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: the autarchical activity of the monad was interpreted in the sense of a tendency (appétition) to pass from the one representation to the other. This tendency, in scholastic formulation conceived of as a "causa finalis", brings in motion, in every monad alike, the system of representations in which the universe is reflected (20).
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(20) Monadologie 15: "L'action du principe interne, qui fait le changement, ou le passage d'une perception, à une autre, peut être appellé Appétition; it est vrai, que l'appétit ne saurait toujours parvenir entièrement à toute la perception, où il tend, mais it en obtient toujours quelque chose, et parvient à des perceptions nouvelles." ["The activity of the internal principle which effects the change or the passing of a perception into another, may be called Appetition; it is true, that the appetite cannot always entirely reach the perception to which it tends, but it always attains something of the same, and arrives at new perceptions."]
Ib. 79: "Les âmes agissent selon les lois des causes finales par appétitions, fins et moyens." ["The souls act acording to the laws of final causes by appetitions, aims and means"].
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This logicization of the concept of force was not a "deus ex machina" in LEIBNIZ' monadology.
As we have seen, the monad is primarily the hypostatized differential in the infinitesimal calculus (21).
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(21) LEIBNIZ called them metaphysical points, and according to him mathematical points are their "point de vûe", which enables them to express the universe. See his Syst. Nouv. 11 (ERDM. p. 126) : "II n'y a que les atomes de substance, c'est à dire, les unités réelles, et absolument destituées de parties, qui soient les sources des actions, et les premiers principes absolus de la composition des choses, et comme les derniers élémens de l'analyse des substances. On les pourroit appeler, points métaphysiques: ils ont quelque chose de vital, et une espèce de perception, et les points mathématiques sont leur point de vûe, pour exprimer l'Univers... Ainsi les points physiques ne sont indivisibles qu'en apparence; les points mathématiques sont exacts, mais ce ne sont que des modalités: il n'y a que les points métaphysiques ou de substance... qui soient exacts et réels; et sans eux il n'y auroit rien de réel, puisque sans les véritables unités il n'y auroit point de multitude." ["There are no other atoms but the substantial ones, that is to say the real units which absolutely lack parts; they are the very sources of the actions, and the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and the last elements of the analysis of the substances. They might be called metaphysical points: they have a kind of vitality and a kind of perception, and the mathematical points are their view-point in order to express the Universe... Consequently, the physical points are indivisible only in appearance; the mathematical points are exact but they are nothing but modalities; only the metaphysical or substantial points... are both exact and real; and without them there would be nothing real, because without the veritable units, there would be no multitude at all."]
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Now the differential number, as we shall explain in our analysis of its modal meaning in the following volume, anticipates the modal meaning of motion (22).
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(22) Here is meant motion in its original exact pre-physical sense, as it was viewed by GALILEO and is made the "Gegenstand" of an apriori mathematical science, viz. the phoronomy (KANT).
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Meanwhile, the original meaning of motion is logicized by LEIBNIZ ; it is transformed into an Idea of mathematical thought-movement and is then laid as ὑπόθεσις at the foundation of natural science (23).
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(23) See GERHARDT'S edition V, 437, 10.
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This also paved the way for the logicizing of the concept of force which in LEIBNIZ' monadology is the necessary prerequisite for the movement of thought and of the lower perceptions.
Insofar as it must guarantee the closed autarchy of the monadic individuals, "force", as a tendency, only continued to be the expression of LEIBNIZ' individualistic personality-ideal, because it never becomes active through functional causes outside the monads.
LEIBNIZ' intellectual determinism and his doctrine of innate Ideas in the light of the lex continui.
DESCARTES had utilized a partial indeterminism to explain both the possibility of ethical faults and error in thought. This is no longer necessary in LEIBNIZ' system. In fact it is even impossible here.
For this partial indeterminism implied the acceptance of an "influxus physicus". As we have seen the latter was intrinsically contradictory in DESCARTES' system; nevertheless, it was necessary to explain the origin of sensorily confused perceptions. The will possesses a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae with respect to these confused perceptions. If one allows himself to be influenced by them, one turns away from the path of clear and distinct thought, and error and "sin", respectively, arise in the theoretical and practical realm.
In LEIBNIZ' metaphysics, on the contrary, the Idea of the absolute windowlessness, the absolute inner self-sufficiency of the monads, excludes any "influxus physicus". Even the sensory perceptions in the human soul-monad are produced in absolute autarchy, entirely from the inside (24).
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(24) Monadologie 51 (ERDMANN, p. 709) : "Mais dans les substances simples ce n'est qu'une influence idéale d'une Monade sur l'autre, qui ne peut avoir son effet que par l'intervention de Dieu, en tant que dans les idées de Dieu une Monade demande avec raison, que Dieu en réglant les autres dès le commencement des choses, ait regard à elle. Car puisqu'une Monade créée ne sauroit avoir une influence physique sur l'intérieur de l'autre, ce n'est que par ce moyen, que l'une peut avoir de la dépendance de l'autre." [But in the simple substances it is only an ideal influence of a Monad over the other, an influence which cannot have its effect but by the intervention of God; namely, in so far as in the Ideas of God a Monad demands in good reason that, in arranging the others since the beginning, God has regard to it. For, because a created Monad cannot have a physical influence over the inner life of the other, it is only in this way that one can be dependent on the other].
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On the other hand, the sharp antithesis between sensibility and logical thought had disappeared. Consequently, error of thought and "sin" acquire a less accentuated significance than they had in DESCARTES.
The proclamation of a "primacy of the will", even if only partial, has become superfluous because of the lex continui. The irrational gap between sensory perception and the clear concept is bridged over by the logical mathematical principle of continuity. Both sin and error of thought are in LEIBNIZ only the consequence of the metaphysical imperfection of the finite rational monads, through which clear mathematical thought is again and again obscured by sensory "perceptions". They are only gradual conditions, since from the sensory perceptions the clear mathematical concept can develop itself in a continuous transition.
In this way even DESCARTES' doctrine of innate ideas has been relativized by the lex continui. In a noteworthy manner the latter bridged over the antithesis between sensationalistic and rationalistic trends in epistemology. In his work, Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement, published posthumously in 1765, LEIBNIZ explained the "idées innées" as dormant, virtual representations which are not yet "connues" [of which we are not yet aware]. Potentially present in sensory perceptions, they gradually develop themselves into clear and distinct concepts.
Since all monads in their perceptions equally represent the entire cosmos, in every moment the result of the movement of representations must be the same in each of them: each monad only lives in itself. As we saw, it has no windows by which it can experience anything of the other monads; all of them experience the same things: their representations are in exact correspondence with each other by means of a pre-established harmony, and in this way it appears as though they continually influence each other.
Here LEIBNIZ' cosmonomic Idea clearly discloses itself in the Idea of Harmonia Praestabilita. In keeping with the mathematical science-ideal the latter implies the most stringent determinism in the process of development of the representations. Not the least margin is allowed in this process. For, if a single monad could arbitrarily deviate from the universally identical course of representations, the harmony in the whole cosmos would be disturbed. Every momentary condition of a monad is a natural consequence of its preceding condition: "the present is pregnant with the future" (25).
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(25) Monadologie 22 (ERDMANN, p. 706), Compare also the well-known place in the Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce: "Car tout est réglé dans les choses une fois pour toutes avec autant d'ordre et de correspondance qu'il est possible; la suprême Sagesse et Bonté ne pouvant agir qu'avec une parfaite harmonie. Le présent est Gros de l'avenir: le futur se pourroit lire dans le passé; l'éloigné est exprimé dans le prochain. On pourroit connaître la beauté de l'Univers dans chaque âme, si l'on pouvoit déplier tous ses replis, qui ne se développent sensiblement qu'avec le temps." ["For everything is regulated in the things once for all with as much order and correspondence as possible: the highest Wisdom and Goodness being unable to act without a perfect harmony. The present is pregnant with the future: the future would permit itself to be read in the past; the distant is expressed in the proximate. One would be able to know the beauty of the Universe in every soul, if one could lay bare all its secrets which do not develop themselves perceptively but in course of time"].
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LEIBNIZ' standpoint in the problem of freedom of the will — the stumbling block between the science-ideal and the ideal of personality in Humanistic philosophy — is thereby implicitly determined.
This German thinker rejected the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae that DESCARTES maintained with respect to the sensory representations. He called this conception of the freedom of the will an indifferentia aequilibrii by which, in the last analysis, action would be able to occur without any ground.
In his short essay De Libertate, first published by ERDMANN, LEIBNIZ asserted, that all actions of substances are determined: "Nihil fit sine ratione" (26).
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(26) ERDMANN, p. 669: "Omnes tamen actiones sunt determinatae et nunquam indifferentes, quia semper datur ratio inclinans quidem nontamen necessitans, ut sic potius, quam aliter fiat. Nihil fit sine ratione. Libertas indifferentiae est impossibilis." ["All actions, however, are determined and never indifferent, because there is always given some directing, although not compelling reason, that it happens rather in this way than otherwise. Nothing happens without reason. A libertas indifferentiae is impossible."]
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The Idea of the harmonia praestabilita implies the acceptance of a "praedispositio rerum ex causis aut causarum series" (27).
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(27) Compare Causa Dei asserta per justitiam eius (ERDMANN, p. 660) :
"Neque etiam praedispositio rerum aut causarum series nocet libertati." [For also the predestination of things or the series of causes does not harm freedom].
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The spiritual monad is a sort of automaton spirituale: everything in man is predetermined (28).
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(28) Theodicée 1, 52 (ERDMANN, p. 517).
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But, according to LEIBNIZ, this stringent determinedness of the will is in no way in conflict with the freedom of the rational personality. It may not be understood in the sense of mechanical coercion. The determining causes are only "inclinantes, non necessitantes". Insofar as the principle of action lies in the one who acts, the action is voluntary. Naturally, for the monad is autarchical; it has no windows. The freedom of man is greater in proportion to the degree in which he acts in accord with reason; he becomes a slave when he allows his actions to be determined by blind emotions and passions.
The ideal of personality was still conceived of individualistically. It required that the monads be thought of as autarchical and active individuals. However, in the philosophic basic Idea of "harmonia praestabilita" the individuality of the monads is brought under the absolute domination of the mathematical science-ideal. This subjugation was accomplished by means of the lex continui, the principle of universal order and coherence in the cosmos (principium quoddam generale).
The lex continui, as well as the harmonia praestabilita in which it is encompassed, owe their origin to the deity. The deity, in turn, is, as we observed, only the hypostasis of pure creative mathematical thought, which is no longer troubled by sensory representations. Volition is only a modus of thought. The deity is at the outset identified with world-harmony. In LEIBNIZ the Spinozistic "Deus sive natura" becomes the "Harmonia universalis, id est Deus" (29). The kernel of this Idea of world-harmony is actually the functionalistic mathematical lex continui.
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(29) Compare LEIBNIZ' letter to the Duke JOHANN FRIEDRICH V. BRAUNSCHWEIG (1671), Gerh. I, 61.
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(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I/ Part 2/ Chapt 2 /§2 pp 223-240)
