Albrecht Altdorfer "Buaidh Alasdair Mhòir aig Issu" 1529
Breithneachadh teòiriceach agus di-theòiriceach. Chan eil an seòrsa deireannach di-loidigeach idir, ach dìreach neo-"gegenständlich".
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Theoretical and non-theoretical judgments. The latter are never a-logical, but merely non-"gegenständlich".
As we have shown before in our transcendental criticism of theoretic thought, the matter stands thus: theoretical judgments are abstract, distinguishing and combining modal meanings. They embody theoretical knowledge, which exists in an intermodal synthesis of meaning between the logical aspect of thought and the modal meaning of an a-logical aspect of our experience which has been made into a "Gegenstand".
These judgments are subjected to the norm of theoretical truth, which holds for scientific knowledge.
The non-theoretical, so-called "practical" judgments are not a-logical — no judgment can be a-logical — but merely non-"gegenständlich", i.e. not grounded in the theoretical attitude of knowledge, which sets the logical aspect of thought in contrast to the abstracted a-logical aspect of experience.
They are subjected to the norm of pre-theoretical truth, which holds for pre-scientific knowledge but possesses universal validity as well as the norm of theoretical truth (1).
As all temporal truth is based on the temporal coherence of meaning of the logical and the non-logical aspects of reality, it points out beyond itself to the fulness of meaning of verity, which is given only in the religious totality of meaning of our cosmos in its relation to the Origin.
With respect to its meaning every judgment appeals to the fulness of truth, in which no temporal restriction any longer has meaning. For verity does not allow any limitation as to its fulness of meaning.
He who thus relativizes its validity to a would-be "pure" theoretical thought, and at the same time recognizes that the theoretical scientific judgments do not exhaust the realm of judgments, falls into the logical self-refutation of scepticism.
For, on the one hand, he denies the fulness of truth by relativizing this latter to the special realm of the theoretical, in distinction from the non-theoretical. Yet, on the other hand, he requires for his conception full validity of truth without any restriction (2).
LITT's distinction between theoretical and "weltanschauliche" truth and the self-refutation of this distinction in the sense in which LITT intends it.
LITT makes a sharp distinction between truth in its proper sense of theoretical universally valid verity and the "so-called" "truth of a life- and world-view". In itself, this distinction might make good sense, were it not that LITT actually denies all "weltanschauliche Wahrheit".
For, used with the latter signification, the word "truth" in his view would be merely a predicate, applied to assertions of a life- and world-view, in order thereby to express: "the unmutilated integrity with which a thinker makes confession of his interpretation of life to himself and to others, the inner consistency with which he develops it, the convincing force, with which he knows how to represent and support it and... the agreement between it and his actual behaviour in life" [loc. cit., p. 255: "Die ungeschminkte Aufrichtigkeit, mit der ein Denker sich vor sich selbst und anderen zu seiner Lebensdeutung bekennt, die innere Folgerichtigkeit mit der er sie entwickelt, die überzeugende Kraft, mit der er sie vorzutragen und zu begründen weisz und...die Übereinstimmung zwischen ihr und seiner tätigen Bewährung im Leben."].
The inner contradiction of this dualism. The meaninglessness of judgments, which are alleged not to be subjected to the norm of truth.
However, as soon as we attempt seriously to carry through this conception, it appears to dissolve itself in inner contradiction. For, if the judgments which a life- and world-view provides are not subjected to a universally-valid norm of truth, they lose all meaning. They are really no judgments, and so cannot contain an individual "interpretation of life".
For a subjective "interpretation of life" which is expressed in a series of judgments, makes sense only, if our temporal cosmos in which we live, actually exists as a coherence of meaning. If this is the case, the judgments in which that interpretation is given are necessarily subjected to a universally valid norm of truth, in accordance with which my subjective interpretation should agree with the true state of affairs; in other words, the question is whether or not the judgment is true with respect to the meaning of our cosmos. However, if there is no universally-valid truth with respect to the latter, then I can give no subjective "interpretation of life" either. For I can interpret only that of which I can judge truly that it has a meaning, even though I should personally leave undecided the verity of my individual interpretation.
LITT now supposes, that he can escape these destructive consequences of his standpoint by making theoretical truth in its universal validity the judge as to essence, meaning and limits of the so-called "weltanschauliche Wahrheit". Thus the judgments of the life- and world-view again appear to be subjected to the really mysterious "universally valid theoretical truth" — but only in order immediately to release them again from every norm of verity. For, the universally valid truth in this respect turns out to be that the judgments of the life- and world-view, as assertions of a merely individual impression of life, are situated "beyond truth and falsity".
For LITT, by reason of the transcendental basic Idea of his philosophical system, is, as we saw, still more averse to an intellectualistic philosophy than RICKERT. "Truth" must be restricted to the theoretical realm, if theoretical thought is not again, in the old intellectualistic way, to dominate the life- and world-view of the sovereign personality.
If, however, he persists in the view that, for example, the judgments: "God is the Creator of the world, which He has created to His glory", and indeed: "Religion has to give way to science", are situated "beyond truth and falsity", because they comprise merely individual interpretations of life, then it is necessary to draw the full consequences of this conception. For in this case there cannot even exist any universally valid truth with respect to the totality of meaning of our temporal world either (which indeed according to LITT'S own admission is more than merely theoretical) and its relation to the modal diversity of meaning.
If this consequence too is accepted, then the meaning of a life- and world-view as well as that of philosophic theoretical thought must be denied together with the meaning of "theoretical truth". Theoretical thought has then annihilated its own foundations.
For philosophic thought is directed to the totality of meaning. However, if there exists no universally valid truth as to the relationship of totality, particularity and coherence of meaning, then philosophic thought has no norm of truth either, by which it may be tested.
The pole of absolute scepticism is hereby attained, and consequently the pole of complete self-refutation.
The concept of an "absolute merely theoretical truth" dissolves itself in inner contradiction. Our transcendental critique, however, penetrates behind the logical contradictions, in which the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of "pure theoretical truth" is entangled, to the root of this doctrine and exposes the relativistic bottom on which it builds its theoretical system. Only on the basis of its relativistic religious attitude, can the emphasis be explained, with which this school in modern times tries to safeguard at least theoretical truth against the invasion of relativism, which for a long time has undermined its life- and world-views.
An intrinsically Christian philosophy does not need to learn from the Humanistic ideal of personality, that theoretical thought cannot dominate religion and a life- and world-view. But Humanistic philosophy may learn from our transcendental criticism that, on the contrary, philosophic thought is dependent upon the religious ground-motive of the thinking ego.
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(1) In our treatment of the problem of knowledge, we shall show, that theoretical truth cannot stand alongside of the pre theoretical, but that they make appeal to each other in a deeper sense.
(2) This antinomy goes back to a basic antinomy in the transcendental idea of the thinker. For, on the one hand, he cannot locate the totality of meaning in the theoretical, because, in that case, the personality-ideal with its a-theoretical "values" would be relegated to a corner. But, on the other hand, he supposes he can find his Archimedean point in theoretical thought. A merely logical antinomy does not exist, as we shall see later.
(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I, pp 153-156)
(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I, pp 153-156)
