"Is ann aig feallsanachd a-mhàin a tha an dleastanas a bhith glacadh ann an sealladh na h-iomlanachd na h-aogasan-brìghe eadar-dhealaichte 's iad air an sgaradh le smaoin teòiriceil. San dòigh seo feumaidh feallsanachd cunntas a thoirt seachad an dà chuid airson fiosrachaidh làitheil agus saidheins speisealta."
"Only philosophy has the task of grasping in the view of totality the different modal aspects of meaning as they are set asunder by theoretic thought. In this way, philosophy has to account for both naïve experience and special science."
(Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought)
Ma Yuan "Ceum Beinne as t-Earrach"
"The theoretical character of the transcendental ground-Idea and its relation to naïve experience.
The question may now be raised, why I conceived the contents of the transcendental ground-Idea of philosophy only as a fundamental determination of the relation between origin, totality and modal diversity of meaning in the coherence of the different modal aspects. Is this not much too abstract a conception of this basic Idea?
We have seen, that naïve experience has not yet arrived at the level of theoretical analysis of the different modalities of meaning; therefore it does not explicitly conceive the modal aspects of temporal reality. Reality presents itself to the pretheoretic view exclusively in the typical total-structures of individuality, which encompass all modal aspects together; but the latter are not conceived here in theoretical distinction. Now it appeared, that naïve experience is in no way inconsequential for philosophy. Therefore, it seems insufficient to point the transcendental ground-Idea only toward the theoretical antithesis of the modal aspects of temporal reality.
Every philosophic view of empirical reality ought to be confronted with the datum of naive experience in order to test its ability to account for this datum in a satisfying manner. Therefore, is it not also necessary to direct the contents of the transcendental ground-Idea toward the diversity and coherence of meaning in the typical structures of individuality?
The datum of naive experience as a philosophical problem.
This question I will answer as follows. Philosophy must convert the datum of naive experience into a fundamental philosophic problem. For it is evident, that by maintaining the attitude of naïve experience one would never be able to account for that datum philosophically. Consequently, since philosophy is bound to the theoretic attitude of thought, its transcendental ground-Idea is also bound to the theoretical gegenstand-relation in which temporal reality is set asunder in its modal aspects.
Therefore, philosophy cannot examine the typical structures of individual totality without a theoretical analysis of their given unity. These structures, too, must be made a philosophical problem, and this problem can be no other but that of their temporal unity in the modal diversity of meaning, manifesting itself in the different aspects of reality. Their typical character and their relation to concrete individuality does not derogate
from this state of affairs.
Besides, the transcendental ground-Idea of meaning implies a relation to the cosmonomic side as well as to the factual subject side of temporal reality. And the latter is by nature individual. In other words, this transcendental Idea is also a ground-Idea of type and individuality, but it is always bound to the theoretical gegenstand-relation.
The naive concept of the thing and the special scientific concept of function.
On the level of modern scientific thought the naïve concept of the thing is in the process of being broken up into functional concepts. This is done in order to gain knowledge of the functional coherence of the phenomena within a special modal aspect. Under the influence of the classic Humanistic ideal of science, which we shall examine presently in detail, there was even an evident tendency to eliminate the typical structures of individuality and to dissolve the entire empirical reality into a continuous functional system of causal relations. This was, to be sure, an absolutizing of the scientific concept of function and it could only lead philosophical thought astray. However, this consideration does not derogate from the value of the concept of function as such.
The gain accruing from its application in the different branches of science was enormous. One by one, the modal aspects of temporal reality, especially the mathematical and physical ones, opened to penetrating scientific analysis the secret of their immanent functional relations and laws.
But the more deeply special scientific thought penetrated into its "Gegenstand" (i.e. the abstracted special aspect of reality which limits its field of research), the more sharply was revealed the fundamental deficiency of theoretical thought in comparison with naïve experience.
By being bound to a special scientific viewpoint, a special science loses the vision of the whole with respect to empirical reality, and consequently the integral empirical reality itself is lost from its grasp. If special science were to be entirely autonomous, this void could never be filled and special science would be impossible for lack of a veritable view of reality. For temporal reality is not given in abstracted modal aspects; it does not give itself „gegenständlich". Special science is never in a position to account for our naïve experience of things; it cannot even render an account of its own possibility.
Naïve experience has an integral vision of the whole, so far as it conceives of temporal things and events in their typical structures of individual totality. Furthermore, so far as it is rooted in the ground-motive of the Christian religion, naïve experience also has the radical and integral view of temporal reality by which the latter is concentrically conceived in its true religious root and in its relation to its true Origin. But its view of the whole is a naïve one, which for lack of a theoretical insight into the modal diversity of meaning does not satisfy the requirements of the transcendental ground-Idea as hypothesis of philosophic thought. The concrete unity of things is not a problem to naïve experience.
Philosophy, special science, and naive experience.
Only philosophy has the task of grasping in the view of totality the different modal aspects of meaning as they are set asunder by theoretic thought. In this way, philosophy has to account for both naïve experience and special science."
(Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I: pp 82-85)
